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Abstract
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents
and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety
of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only
has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the
effect is zero. Furthermore, for both killer and other acquisitions, we identify market
conditions under which the innovation effect is small, so that prohibiting acquisitions
to enhance competition would be justified.
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1 Introduction
Mergers rarely trigger interventions by competition authorities unless they involve substan-
tial additions of incumbent market shares. Recently, many competition policy practitioners
and academics have argued that this approach to merger control may be flawed. There is
an increasing concern that mergers between firms that are not currently competing might
be problematic as well, because they may eliminate potential competition.1 Such worries
even arise when “the target firm has no explicit or immediate plans to challenge the incum-
bent firm on its home turf, but is one of several firms that is best placed to do so in the
next several years” (Shapiro, 2018). The issue becomes more pressing when the acquiree
is working on a technology that would enable it to compete against the incumbent in the
near future.
Such concerns arise in various sectors. For instance, in the digital economy, Alphabet,
Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft bought start-ups worth a total of 31.6 billion
USD in 2017.2 Google acquired about one firm per month between 2001 and 2018.3 There
are several conceivable motives for such behavior. For instance, the acquiring firms may
be better at commercializing the ideas of the start-ups, so that an acquisition may be
efficient. Recent evidence suggests, however, that anti-competitive motives may also be
important. The work of Cunningham et al. (2020) for the pharmaceutical industry is a
compelling case in point. The authors show that incumbent firms often engage in so-called
killer acquisitions by purchasing start-ups with the sole purpose of eliminating potential
competition without intending to commercialize the entrant’s innovation.4 Even when
incumbents do commercialize the innovation, acquisitions need not be innocuous, as they
may widen the technological lead of a dominant incumbent, making entry ever harder (e.g.
Bryan and Hovenkamp, 2020b).
These considerations suggest rethinking the predominant practice in most jurisdictions,
which is to wave through acquisitions of small innovative start-ups by incumbent firms.5
Indeed, there appears to be a broad consensus among economists that this approach is
excessively lenient. That said, a per-se prohibition of start-up acquisitions would not
1This concern is reflected in policy reports such as Crémer et al. (2019) (“EU Report”), Furman et al.
(2019) (“Furman Report”) or Scott Morton et al. (2019) (“Stigler Report”); see also Salop (2016), Salop
and Shapiro (2017), Hovenkamp and Shapiro (2017), Bryan and Hovenkamp (2020b).
2See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Alphabet
3See The Economist 26/10/2018 “American tech giants are making life tough for start-ups”. For
more descriptive statistics on start-up acquisitions, see Gautier and Lamesch (2020). Examples include
Facebook’s takeovers of WhatsApp, Instagram and Oculus CR, Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick, Waze
and YouTube, and Microsoft ’s purchases of GitHub and LinkedIn.
4The use of the “killer” metaphor in the literature is not uniform. For instance, by contrast with
Cunningham et al. (2020), other authors apply the expression “kill zone” to start-up activities that are so
close to those of dominant incumbents that they may trigger acquisitions or hostile behavior towards the
entrant, without implying that the incumbent would not commercialize the start-up’s technologies.
5A rare early exception was the FTC’s intervention against the acquisition of HeartWare by Thor-
atec, a maker of left ventricular assist devices, in 2009 on the grounds that “HeartWare alone represents
a significant threat to Thoratec’s LVAD monopoly;” see https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2009/07/090730thorateadminccmpt.pdf. More recently, there have been further in-
terventions (see OECD, 2020). The biotech firm Illumina abandoned its proposed acquisition of the small
rival Pacific Biosciences following opposition of the U.S. FTC and the U.K. CMA. The former explicitly
referred to the extinction of Pacific Biosciences as a “nascent competitive threat”. For similar reasons, the
FTC imposed a divestiture before approving the acquisition of College Park by Ossur, both producers of
prosthetic devices.
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be desirable either: For instance, as many observers have pointed out, the prospect of
selling the shop should increase the entrant’s incentive to engage in innovation in the first
place, no matter whether the acquirer commercializes the entrant’s product or not.6 Going
back at least to Rasmussen (1988), several academic papers have made this point in formal
models (see Section 2). However, the extent to which prohibiting acquisitions will decrease
the entrant’s incentive to innovate (as well as the extent of the anti-competitive harm)
should be expected to depend on the characteristics of the market under consideration.
This suggests a market-by-market approach towards treating start-up acquisitions, where
the competition authority intervenes only in markets where the benefits from preserving
potential competition outweigh any possible negative effects on innovation.
The purpose of our paper is to provide guidance for such an approach. Our analysis
is based on a novel theory of R&D project choice, which enables us to study variety and
duplication of R&D projects in which incumbents and start-ups invest. We characterize
the innovation effect of prohibiting acquisitions. We show that it is weakly negative and
describe how its size depends on market characteristics. We use our theory to analyze
the effects of acquisition policy and other interventions on innovation. In particular, our
analysis can help to identify industries where prohibiting acquisitions is more appropriate
than elsewhere.
With this goal in mind, we provide a model that is generic rather than specifically
tailored to any single industry. In this model, an incumbent monopolist possesses a tech-
nology that allows her to operate in a product market without incurring any innovation
cost. By contrast, an entrant has to innovate in order to produce. Contrary to most
papers in the innovation literature, which only analyze the overall level of R&D spending,
we allow firms to strategically choose in which innovation projects to invest as well as
how much to invest in each project. Such a representation captures important aspects of
real-world innovation decisions.7 We assume that there is a continuum of projects and
that firms choose a subset of projects to invest in. Ex ante, projects exclusively differ
with respect to investment costs; ex post, only one project will lead to an innovation.
This innovation can be drastic or non-drastic, with exogenous probability of each case.
We assume that, even when both firms discover an innovation, only one of them gets a
patent. A patent holder who commercializes a drastic innovation earns monopoly prof-
its (which are higher than what the incumbent previously obtained), and the other firm
cannot compete. A non-drastic innovation allows the entrant to compete, while it may
or may not allow the incumbent to increase her profits. In a laissez-faire setting without
policy interventions, the incumbent can acquire the entrant once the innovation outcomes
become common knowledge. We assume that an acquisition takes place if and only if it
6See for instance Bourreau and de Streel (2019), Crémer et al. (2019), Furman et al. (2019) and, most
recently, Cabral (2020). It should be noted that the prospect of buying an innovative entrant could have a
negative effect on the incumbent’s incentives to innovate, since the incumbent can protect her monopoly
by acquiring the entrant. Therefore, the overall effect that a prohibition of start-up acquisitions would
have on innovation is unclear ex ante.
7In the pharmaceutical industry, development of new vaccines typically involves exploring various
approaches simultaneously, such as using the attenuated or deactivated whole virus, or only DNA or
virus-like particles, among others. Often, it is not clear ex-ante which approach will work; see for instance
Le et al. (2020) for Covid-19 vaccine development. A prominent example for different approaches to an
innovation in the digital industry is the development of the internet. While there were multiple competing
methods to connect different networks and transmit data, the packet switching method turned out to be
the one efficient enough to build the internet as we know it today (Leiner et al., 2009).
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increases joint payoffs. In case an acquisition takes place, the trading surplus is split ac-
cording to exogenously given shares reflecting bargaining power.8 The firm possessing the
innovation technology then decides whether to commercialize it at some fixed cost or not.
We compare this laissez-faire setting with an alternative policy regime where acquisitions
are prohibited.
We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium structure, which enables us to
analyze policy effects on innovation strategies. Our main focus is on the effects of pro-
hibiting start-up acquisitions on innovation.9 The analysis turns out to be non-trivial
because incumbents and entrants react differently to such a policy. Nevertheless, we ob-
tain clear results. We distinguish between two parameter regimes according to whether the
non-drastic innovation is sufficiently attractive that the incumbent would want to commer-
cialize it or not.10 Our analysis reveals a critical and surprising difference between these
two cases. While prohibiting acquisitions always has a strictly negative innovation effect in
the case without commercialization (i.e. for killer acquisitions), this is not necessarily true
for acquisitions with commercialization. Thus, even though killer acquisitions may appear
to be particularly problematic, the case for prohibiting them is not necessarily stronger
than for acquisitions with commercialization if one takes ex-ante innovation incentives into
account.
Crucially, in all equilibria in the killer acquisition case, the entrant’s incentives deter-
mine the variety of innovation projects pursued. As the absence of the acquisition option
reduces his investment incentives, overall variety declines when acquisitions are prohibited.
By contrast, when non-drastic innovations are sufficiently valuable for the incumbent to
commercialize, her incentives to innovate may be higher than those of the entrant. In this
case, the incumbent’s incentives (rather than the entrant’s) will be decisive for the variety
of innovation, and it will turn out that they are not affected by the policy regime. Without
an adverse innovation effect, the prohibition of acquisitions is welfare-improving because
it exclusively enhances competition.
In all other cases, however, policy has to trade off the positive competition effect of
preventing acquisitions against the negative innovation effect. To this end, it is useful to
understand for which market characteristics the innovation effect is likely to be small. We
show that, from a consumer surplus perspective, the pro-competitive effects of prohibiting
acquisitions are likely to dominate the adverse innovation effects in markets in which
the entrant’s bargaining power is low and potential competition between entrants and
incumbents is not too intense. Thus, innovation effects should not be seen as a carte
blanche for allowing acquisitions. Rather, whether or not acquisitions should be allowed
depends on the specifics of the industry.
8This assumption is in line with several related papers, e.g., Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), Cabral
(2018) and Kamepalli et al. (2020).
9An outright prohibition is not the only way to handle acquisitions. Alternatively, firms acquiring
innovative targets may be put under particular scrutiny ex post. For instance, after Mallinckrodt ’s sub-
sidiary Questcor acquired the rights for Synacthen from Novartis, the FTC successfully took the firm
to court for anti-competitive behavior, which was manifest in excessive prices (see https://www.ftc.
gov/system/files/documents/cases/170118mallinckrodt\_complaint\_public.pdf). For a broader
discussion of conceivable policy responses, see OECD (2020).
10This distinction mirrors the contrast between killer acquisitions and nascent potential competitor
theory of harms. As to the latter case, it arises if “the acquired product might grow into a rival product,
and hence ... controlling that product (but not killing it), removes the competitive threat that it poses”
(OECD, 2020, p.7).
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Apart from variety, the acquisition policy affects other aspects of innovation strategies.
Since firms can select between R&D projects rather than merely choose overall R&D
effort, we can separate the effects of acquisitions on innovation probability from those
on innovation efforts. When acquiring the entrant is not allowed, the incumbent has a
stronger incentive to invest in the same R&D projects as the entrant because this is now the
only strategy to prevent competition. Due to the potential increase in R&D duplication,
the prohibition of start-up acquisitions may increase the overall R&D investments, while
nevertheless resulting in a lower probability of discovering the innovation.
In spite of our focus on acquisition policy, our analysis also provides some insights on
other policy measures. We show that the variety of pursued projects is weakly increasing
in the entrant’s bargaining power and in his stand-alone duopoly profits. By contrast,
variety is weakly decreasing in the incumbent’s stand-alone duopoly profits. Thus, any
policy which improves the market position of start-ups relative to incumbents tends to
increase the variety of equilibrium innovation projects and thereby the probability of a
successful innovation. While innovation policies targeting small firms are usually justified
as a way to alleviate financial constraints of those firms (see Bloom et al., 2019, p. 178),
our analysis suggests that such policies have a positive innovation effect even in the absence
of such constraints.
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 charac-
terizes innovation behavior in the laissez-faire case. Section 5 deals with the effects of
prohibiting acquisitions. Section 6 presents additional results. It analyzes the welfare
trade-offs. Further, it provides a comparison to a one-dimensional model where firms only
choose innovation efforts. Finally, it shows the robustness of the conclusions to modifica-
tions in the assumptions (uncertainty about innovation outcomes at the acquisition stage,
technological asymmetries and multiple entrants). Section 7 concludes. All proofs of the
formal results are in Appendix A. Appendix B provides additional formal results and
proofs which support our claims in Section 6.
2 Relation to the Literature
Cunningham et al. (2020) not only provide empirical evidence for the existence of killer
acquisitions, but they also develop a theoretical model to explain the rationale behind
discontinuing development. The main difference between their model and ours is that we
emphasize the initial innovation decisions, which they do not analyze.
Recent theoretical literature on mergers and innovation has mainly focused on mergers
between incumbents, analyzing how product market characteristics, the nature of innova-
tion and the innovation technology determine whether mergers reduce or increase (one-
dimensional) innovation efforts. Federico et al. (2017, 2018) and Motta and Tarantino
(2018) identify negative effects, whereas Denicolò and Polo (2018) find positive effects.
In Bourreau et al. (2019), both possibilities arise.11 In models with multiple research
approaches, Letina (2016) and Gilbert (2019) obtain negative effects on R&D diversity;
Letina also finds that mergers reduce research duplication. Moraga-González et al. (2019)
11A related literature investigates the effects of the number of firms on innovation, see e.g. Yi (1999),
Norbäck and Persson (2012) and Marshall and Parra (2019). More broadly related, many papers dis-
cuss the relation between other measures of competitive intensity and innovation; see Vives (2008) and
Schmutzler (2013) for unifying approaches.
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show that mergers can potentially increase welfare by alleviating biases in the direction of
innovation.12
While maintaining the emphasis on multiple research approaches, we address a funda-
mentally different question, namely how the possibility of acquiring entrants affects the
innovations of incumbents and entrants. The literature on this topic goes back at least
to Rasmussen (1988) who identified an incentive to enter a market to get bought by the
current incumbent, suggesting that a lenient acquisition policy can increase welfare by
incentivizing entry; see Mason and Weeds (2013) for similar reasoning. In Phillips and
Zhdanov (2013) a laissez-faire policy not only fosters the entrant’s innovation, but also
the incumbent’s.13 Mermelstein et al. (2020) and Hollenbeck (2020) use computational
methods to study the long-run effects of merger policy in dynamic oligopoly models with
entry-for-buyout incentives; the latter finds that prohibiting mergers can lead to a lower
rate of innovation and lower long-run consumer welfare. By contrast, Kamepalli et al.
(2020) and Katz (2020) argue that, in the tech industry, a laissez-faire policy may have
negative effects on start-up innovations.14 Fumagalli et al. (2020) focus on acquisitions of
financially constrained start-ups. They identify a novel benefit of acquisitions, which in
this setting enable the incumbent to bankroll the development of innovations beyond the
capabilities of the start-up, and they characterize the optimal competition policy.
In related papers, Gans and Stern (2000) and Gans et al. (2002) focus on the endogenous
decision of start-ups to sell their technology or enter the product market, while Bryan
and Hovenkamp (2020a) consider distortions in the innovation decisions of start-ups who
produce inputs for competing incumbents, without considering entry into this competition.
In Cabral (2018) asymmetric competitors can pay to acquire each others’ knowledge (a
technology transfer rather than an acquisition).
Compared with the above literature, the goal of our paper is to identify market charac-
teristics driving the size of the innovation effect and justifying intervention. On a closely
related note, we also show how the case for intervention differs between killer acquisitions
and others. Our emphasis on innovation portfolios allows us to analyze policy effects on
project variety and duplication rather than merely on overall innovation efforts.
3 The Model
We will consider two variants of a multi-stage game, corresponding to different policy
regimes. We will first describe the game capturing a laissez-faire policy (A) which tolerates
acquisitions, then we will consider a no-acquisition policy (N). We capture the laissez-faire
policy in a multi-stage game between two firms, an entrant (i = E) and an incumbent
(i = I). The entrant has to invest in R&D before he can produce. The incumbent owns a
technology with which she can produce goods. In addition, she can invest in R&D as well.
12More broadly related are Bryan and Lemus (2017) who study the direction of innovation, Letina
and Schmutzler (2019) who consider research variety in innovation contests, Bardey et al. (2016) who
analyze the effect of health insurance policy on diversity of treatment options and Bavly et al. (2020) who
introduce asymmetric beliefs about the success of different projects.
13This difference to our work arises because the authors allow large firms to sell their own product and
the target’s product after the acquisition, so that there is an additional value from applying an innovation
to the target’s product as well as the own product.
14While the results of the two papers are similar, the central mechanisms differ. In Kamepalli et al.
(2020), expectations of “techies” (potential early adopters of a new technology) drive the result. In Katz
(2020), the key assumption is that potential entrants can choose innovation quality.
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In the first stage of the game, the investment stage, the firms choose in which research
projects θ from a continuum Θ = [0, 1) to invest, and, for each project, how much to
invest. Only one project, θ̂ ∈ Θ, will result in an innovation (be the correct project). All
other projects will lead to a dead end and produce no valuable output. We assume that
each project is equally likely to be correct. For all θ ∈ [0, 1), each firm chooses a research
intensity ri(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. If θ̂ is the correct project, then ri(θ̂) is the probability that firm
i will discover the innovation. We restrict the firms’ choices to the set R of measurable
functions r : [0, 1) → [0, 1]. The cost of investing with intensity ri in project θ is given
as ri(θ)C(θ), where the cost function C : [0, 1)→ R+ is continuous, differentiable, strictly
increasing and convex. Moreover, we assume that limθ→1C(θ) = ∞ and that C(0) = 0.




The correct research project θ̂ can lead to two levels of innovation. With exogeneously
given probability p, the correct project results in a high technological state (H), corre-
sponding to a drastic innovation compared to the incumbent’s current technology. With
probability 1 − p, the correct project results in a low technological state (L). L corre-
sponds to a non-drastic innovation, which would allow the entrant to compete with the
incumbent and obtain positive profits from the product market. If a single firm discovers
the innovation, it receives a patent. If both firms discover the innovation, only one firm
receives the patent, which is allocated randomly with equal probability.15 We assume that
only the patent holder can use the new technology. Once the correct project has been
realized, both firms learn the resulting technology level, summarized in the interim tech-
nology states (tintI , tintE ) ∈ T := {(`, 0), (`, L), (`,H), (L, 0), (H, 0)}, where ` corresponds to
the incumbent’s initial technology and 0 corresponds to the entrant’s initial technology.
In the second stage of the game under laissez-faire, the acquisition stage, the incumbent
can acquire the entrant by paying the profits that the latter could achieve by competing
on the market plus a share of the (bargaining) surplus β ∈ (0, 1). We will assume that
the acquisition takes place if and only if the bargaining surplus is strictly positive. If the
entrant is acquired, then any patent held by the entrant is transferred to the incumbent.
In the third stage, the commercialization stage, the patent holder can bring the new
technology to the market at some commercialization cost κ > 0.16 We denote the technol-
ogy states resulting after the acquisition and commercialization stages as final technology
states (tfinI , t
fin
E ) ∈ T . Finally, in the product market stage, the firms collect product mar-
ket profits which depend on the technology available to the firms. Denote the profit of firm
i ∈ {I, E}, when it has technology ti and its competitor has technology tj, as π(ti, tj).17
We introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Market profits).
(i) Profits are non-negative, so that π(ti, tj) ≥ 0 for any ti and tj. Monopoly profits are
strictly positive, that is, π(ti, 0) > 0 for any ti.
(ii) Without an innovation, the entrant cannot compete. Thus, π(0, tj) = 0 for tj ∈
{`, L,H}.
15We consider asymmetric chances of receiving patents in Section 6.3.2.
16Implicit is the assumption that the commercialization is equally costly for both firms. As we show in
Section 6.3.3, none of our main insights depends on this assumption.
17It may be helpful (but is not necessary) to think of technology states as real numbers corresponding
to product quality or the (inverse) cost level.
6
(iii) Technology H corresponds to a drastic innovation, so that the owner gets the monopoly
profit π(H) := π(H, `) = π(H, 0) > max{π(L, 0), π(`, 0)} and π(`,H) = 0.
(iv) Competition decreases total profits, that is, max{π(L, 0), π(`, 0)} > π(`, L) +π(L, `).
We do not assume that technology L is necessarily an improvement over the status-quo
technology ` for the incumbent: π(L, 0) > π(`, 0) and π(L, 0) ≤ π(`, 0) are both possible.
Assumption 2. Commercialization costs satisfy
(i) π(L, `) ≥ κ;
(ii) π(H)− π(`, 0) ≥ κ.
Thus, for the entrant, even the duopoly profit obtained thanks to a non-drastic innova-
tion is at least as high as the commercialization cost. For the incumbent, the increase in the
monopoly profit obtained by using the drastic innovation outweighs the commercialization
cost. For the non-drastic innovation, this may or may not be the case.
We refer to the firms’ continuation payoffs at the beginning of the acquisition stage,
conditional on the realization of the interim states tintI and tintE , as their values vI(tintI , tintE )
and vE(tintE , tintI ), respectively. These values depend on the policy regime (laissez-faire or no-
acquisition). When either firm has state H, the values are independent of the competitor
state; thus, we simply write vI(H) and vE(H). The expected total payoff of the incumbent
who chooses an investment function rI(θ) when facing an entrant who chooses rE(θ) is










(1− rI(θ))rE(θ) [(1− p)vI(`, L)] dθ +
∫ 1
0






















The first integral captures the innovation costs that the incumbent incurs by using the
innovation strategy rI . The second integral represents the incumbent’s continuation payoff
when she discovers an innovation and the entrant does not. The third integral captures
her continuation payoff in the opposite case, when she does not discover an innovation but
the entrant does. The fourth integral represents the continuation payoff when neither firm
innovates, and the fifth is for the case when both firms innovate.





















We will characterize subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. For the investment stage,
this amounts to finding functions rI , rE ∈ R such that for any r′I , r′E ∈ R
EΠI(rI , rE) ≥ EΠI(r′I , rE)
EΠE(rE, rI) ≥ EΠE(r′E, rI).18
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The characterization of the equilibrium investment will rely on critical projects θ1E, θ2E,
θ1I and θ2I , which are defined implicitly by:




(pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `))













− (1− p)vI(`, L).
Roughly speaking, the critical projects are those for which the innovation cost equals
the expected future profit increases they generate. To make this notion precise, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between incumbents and entrants; moreover, we differentiate between
cases when firms are expecting the competitor to invest in the same project and when
they are not. Accordingly, project θ1i is defined by the requirement that its cost equals
the expected value increase to firm i if it invests in the correct project when the other
firm does not. Since project costs are increasing in θ, this implies that firm i would want
to invest in any θ ∈ [0, θ1i ) for which it assumes that the competitor does not invest in,
and it would not want to invest in any θ ∈ (θ1i , 1) in which it believes the competitor is
not investing. Similarly, θ2i is defined by the requirement that its cost equals the expected
value increase to firm i if it invests in a correct project in which the other firm invests as
well. If firm i believes that the competitor is going to invest in some project in θ ∈ [0, θ2i ),
then it wants to invest in this project as well; similarly, it does not want to invest in any
θ ∈ (θ2i , 1) if it believes the competitor invests in this project. These observations will help
us to determine the best reply of firm i to rj(θ) at any project θ, based on the location of
θ relative to θ1i and θ2i . This will be a crucial ingredient of the equilibrium analysis.
To sum up, the incumbent and the entrant play a multi-stage game, which has the
following stages under a laissez-faire policy (A).
1. Investment stage: Nature determines the correct project, and whether the inno-
vation is drastic (H) or non-drastic (L). Simultaneously with the move of nature,
firms invest in research projects. Thereafter all uncertainty is resolved. If only one
firm discovers the innovation, it receives the patent on the underlying technology (L
or H). If both firms discover the innovation, the patent is allocated randomly with
equal probability. If neither firm discovers the innovation, neither firm receives the
patent. Interim technology states tintI and tintE are realized.
2. Acquisition stage: The firms negotiate an acquisition, which takes place if and
only if it strictly increases total payoffs. If there is an acquisition, the incumbent
pays the entrant the foregone market profits less the commercialization costs, plus a
share β of the bargaining surplus.
3. Commercialization stage: The firm holding the patent (if any) decides whether
to commercialize the technology, thereby incurring costs κ. At the end of the com-
mercialization stage, the firms’ final technology states tfinI and t
fin
E are realized.
18Obviously, for any equilibrium (rI , rE), any pair of functions (r̃I , r̃E) which only differ from (rI , rE)
on a set of measure zero also is an equilibrium. We omit the necessary “almost everywhere” qualifications
from the statements of our formal results for ease of exposition.
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I ), respectively. Total payoffs result from subtracting potential investment
and commercialization costs and adding/subtracting potential acquisition payments.
We compare the outcome of this game with a set-up corresponding to a no-acquisition
policy (N) that prevents the incumbent from acquiring the entrant. This alternative does
not contain the acquisition stage, whereas all other stages remain as before.
4 Investments under the Laissez-Faire Policy
We now analyze investments in the laissez-faire case. In Section 4.1, we provide some
auxiliary results. In Section 4.2, we characterize the equilibrium investment. Section 4.3
discusses how policy influences innovation behavior.
4.1 Auxilliary Results
We begin by summarizing the result of the acquisition subgame emerging after the real-
ization of the interim technology states.
Lemma 1 (Acquisitions). Under the laissez-faire policy, the incumbent acquires the en-
trant if and only if the latter holds a patent for technology L. In the commercialization
subgame, if the entrant holds the patent to either technology L or technology H, he commer-
cializes it. The incumbent always commercializes technology H, while she commercializes
technology L if and only if π(L, 0)− π(`, 0) ≥ κ.
Intuitively, if the entrant has access to technology L, an acquisition increases total
profits by eliminating competition, whereas it leaves profits unaffected otherwise. The
incumbent’s commercialization decision depends on the value of the non-drastic innovation.
If π(L, 0) − π(`, 0) < κ, commercialization is not worthwhile — the only motive for an
acquisition is the elimination of competition. If π(L, 0) − π(`, 0) ≥ κ, the incumbent
additionally benefits from a better technology.
Using Lemma 1, we obtain firm values after the realization of innovation outcomes.
Lemma 2 (Values). Consider the laissez-faire policy:
(i) The entrant’s values after the realization of the innovation outcomes are
vE(H) = π(H)− κ
vE(L, `) = π(L, `)− κ+ β
(
max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(L, `)− π(`, L) + κ
)
vE(0, tI) = 0 for tI ∈ {`, L,H}.
(ii) The incumbent’s values after the realization of the innovation outcomes are
vI(H) = π(H)− κ
vI(L, 0) = max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)}
vI(`, L) = vI(L, 0)− vE(L, `)
vI(`, 0) = π(`, 0)
vI(`,H) = 0.
The values involving technology L require an explanation. After a non-drastic innova-
tion by the entrant, (tintI , tintE ) = (`, L). The incumbent then acquires the entrant, so that
vE(L, `) is the acquisition price, which consists of the entrant’s stand-alone profit and his
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share of the acquisition surplus. vI(`, L) is the monopolist’s stand-alone profit, net of the
acquisition price. Finally, the max-operators take into account the difference between the
commercialization and non-commercialization case. On the basis of Lemma 2, we can now
discuss the ordering of critical projects (introduced in Section 3), which is essential for the
equilibrium properties.
Lemma 3. Under laissez-faire, the only possible relations between the critical projects are:
(i) θ1I ≤ θ2I = θ2E < θ1E;
(ii) θ2I = θ2E < θ1I < θ1E;
(iii) θ2I = θ2E < θ1E ≤ θ1I .
Relation (iii) can only arise in the case with commercialization.
Lemma 3 reveals some common properties of all equilibria. First, the projects which the
incumbent is willing to duplicate (i.e., invest in if the entrant also does) are exactly those
which the entrant is willing to duplicate as well; we thus write θ2 := θ2I = θ2E.19 Second,
θ2E < θ
1
E, so that the entrant is always willing to invest in a larger range of projects if he
is the sole innovator than if the incumbent also invests in these projects. Intuitively, the
incumbent’s investment reduces the entrant’s probability of receiving a patent.
All orderings of the critical values that are compatible with these two conditions are
consistent with Lemma 3. However, there is a crucial difference between the cases with
and without commercialization. While all three orderings can arise in the former case,
θ1I < θ
1
E must hold in the no-commercialization case, so that only the first two orderings
are possible. Intuitively, conditional on the other firm not investing, the entrant is willing to
invest in more expensive projects than the incumbent. This is due to the well-known Arrow
replacement effect: An L innovation does not increase incumbent profits, and her profit
increase from the H innovation is lower than the entrant’s, since without the innovation
the entrant receives zero profits. Hence, the entrant’s willingness to pay to be the sole
innovator is greater than the incumbent’s. This will be important for our result that
prohibiting acquisitions has a negative effect on equilibrium investments.
Contrary to the no-commercialization case, the incumbent’s critical project θ1I may
lie above the entrant’s critical project θ1E in the commercialization case, as in ordering
(iii). This requires technology L to be sufficiently lucrative for the incumbent, so that the
prospect of discovering it provides a large investment incentive. Moreover, an entrant’s
gain from competing with technology L has to be small and his bargaining power low.20
19To understand why, note that if a project in which both firms invest delivers an H technology, both
firms receive the same expected net payoff from investing, because not investing means losing the high
innovation to the rival and receiving 0 for sure rather than obtaining the high monopoly profit with
probability 1/2. If a project delivers an L technology instead, the entrant gains the acquisition price
with probability 1/2 by investing, while the incumbent saves the acquisition price with probability 1/2 by
investing. Thus, the expected benefits of investing (conditional on the other firm investing) are the same
for entrants and incumbents.
20A simple comparison of the definition of C(θ1I ) and C(θ
1
E) shows that the case in Lemma 3(iii) occurs
if and only if (1− p)vI(L, 0)− vI(`, 0) ≥ (1− p)vE(L, `). Using Lemma 2, this expression can be rewritten
as (1− p) [(1− β)(π(L, 0)− π(L, `)) + βπ(`, L)] ≥ π(`, 0) in the case with commercialization. Hence, this
case occurs when p and β are small (that is, an L-innovation is likely and the incumbent captures most of
the bargaining surplus), π(L, 0) is large and π(`, 0) is small (so that L constitutes a significant innovation,
even if it is a non-drastic one) and when π(L, `) is small (that is, competition is intense).
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4.2 Equilibrium Investments
We now provide a full characterization of the equilibrium R&D investments. The result
will show that both firms invest in all sufficiently cheap projects, but none of the firms
invests in the most expensive projects. Moreover, it will describe how the investment
functions for intermediate cost levels depend on which of the three orderings in Lemma 3
applies.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium R&D investment). In any equilibrium under laissez-faire,
(a) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1 for θ ∈ [0, θ2],
(b) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ (max{θ1E, θ1I}, 1).
(i) If θ1I ≤ θ2 < θ1E, then there exists a unique equilibrium. In addition to (a) and (b),
this equilibrium satisfies rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ (θ2, θ1E].
(ii) If θ2 < θ1I < θ1E, the equilibrium is not unique. A strategy profile is an equilibrium if
and only if it satisfies (a) and (b) as well as (c) and (d) below:
(c) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ (θ1I , θ1E]
(d) for any θ ∈ (θ2, θ1I ] either:
rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, or








(iii) If θ2 < θ1E ≤ θ1I , the equilibrium is not unique. A strategy profile is an equilibrium if
and only if it satisfies (a) and (b) as well as (e) and (f) below:
(e) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ (θ1E, θ1I ]
(f) for any θ ∈ (θ2, θ1E] either:
rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, or








We will refer to equilibria with rE(θ) ∈ {0, 1} and rI(θ) ∈ {0, 1} ∀θ ∈ [0, 1) as simple
equilibria. Proposition 1 implies that a simple equilibrium exists for any choice of param-
eters. In particular, it arises in the cases with and without commercialization. In case (i),
which is depicted in the left plot of Figure 1, both firms invest fully (that is, with ri = 1) in
all projects in the interval [0, θ2], while only the entrant invests in the projects in (θ2, θ1E].
Neither firm invests in projects in (θ1E, 1). In case (ii), this simple equilibrium coexists
with infinitely many other (simple and non-simple) equilibria, reflecting the fact that in
any project in [θ2, θ1I ) each firm only wants to invest if the other one does not. As a result,
in any equilibrium either only one of the firms invests fully in the project whereas the
other one does not invest at all, or both firms invest with intensity between 0 and 1. The
middle plot of Figure 1 shows an equilibrium where both choose intermediate investment









































Figure 1: Equilibrium portfolio of entrant and incumbent for the three cases of Proposition 1:
Case (i) in the left, case (ii) in the middle and case (iii) in the right plot.
In the no-commercialization case, only the equilibrium constellations described under
(i) and (ii) can arise. In the commercialization case, the incumbent has additional in-
vestment incentives coming from the possibility of increasing the monopoly profit with a
non-drastic innovation. Nevertheless, if θ1I < θ1E as without commercialization, the equi-
librium structure is the same. In particular, the entrant’s critical project θ1E is the most
costly one that is pursued in equilibrium. However, the possibility that the critical project
θ1I of the incumbent lies above the critical project θ1E of the entrant has repercussions for
the equilibrium structure. The right plot of Figure 1, which corresponds to Proposition
1(iii), shows one potential equilibrium when θ1I ≥ θ1E. As depicted in the figure, in all
equilibria in this last case, the incumbent’s critical project is the most costly one pursued.
To understand the role of Proposition 1, note that in any equilibrium there exists a set
of projects in which only the firm with higher θ1i invests. Even if this firm decided not to
invest in these projects, which are the most costly among those pursued, the competitor
would not replace the rival’s investments. In the no-commercialization case (where (i)
or (ii) applies), decreasing the entrant’s innovation incentives will cause him to reduce
investment in exactly the projects which cost the most and which only he would pursue. In
the case with commercialization, this logic no longer applies in case (iii), as the incumbent
now is the one whose critical project θ1I is the most costly one pursued.
4.3 The Determinants of Innovation Strategies
We now investigate the drivers of equilibrium R&D strategies in the laissez-faire situation,
which arguably corresponds to the status quo in most jurisdictions. This helps to identify
various policy levers that can influence innovation behavior and outcomes.
We are primarily interested in the policy effects on innovation probability, but this
probability is sensitive to equilibrium selection. For this reason, we introduce a closely
related proxy, namely the variety of research projects pursued in equilibrium. Formally,
given any two research strategies rI and rE, we define variety as
V(rI , rE) =
∫ 1
0
1(rI(θ) + rE(θ) > 0)dθ.
Thus, variety captures the size of the set of projects in which at least one firm invests a
positive amount. The probability that at least one firm discovers an innovation is








The next result, which follows immediately from Proposition 1, shows that variety is a
useful proxy for probability: it is invariant to equilibrium selection, it provides an upper
bound to probability of innovation in any equilibrium and it is actually equal to the
probability in any simple equilibrium.21
Corollary 1. Under a laissez-faire policy, if (rI , rE) is an equilibrium, then V(rI , rE) =
max{θ1E, θ1I} ≥ P(rI , rE). If (rI , rE) is a simple equilibrium, then V(rI , rE) = P(rI , rE).
Thus, we can use Proposition 1 to understand how a marginal parameter change affects
variety and innovation probability:
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics). Consider any equilibrium (rI , rE) under a laissez-
faire policy.
(i) Variety V(rI , rE) is (a) weakly increasing in the bargaining power of the entrant β; it
is (b) weakly decreasing in the incumbent’s profits π(`, L), but (c) weakly increasing
in the entrant’s profits π(L, `) under competition.
(ii) The effects in (i) are strict if θ1I < θ1E and they are zero if θ1I > θ1E.
To see the intuition, first consider the no-commercialization case. There, we know that
θ1I < θ
1
E and thus the entrant’s innovation incentives determine variety. Result (a) follows
strictly because an increase in β makes the innovation more valuable to the entrant. Ac-
cording to (b) and (c), the firms’ duopoly profits affect variety in opposite directions. An
increase in the incumbent’s duopoly profit decreases the acquisition surplus, but leaves
the entrant’s outside option unaffected, so that variety decreases when the incumbent’s
duopoly profit increases. By contrast, the entrant’s competition profit increases his out-
side option, but decreases the acquisition surplus. Since he only receives a share β of
the acquisition surplus, the former effect dominates. In the commercialization case, the
intuition is analogous, except that the parameters do not affect variety if θ1E < θ1I , as they
do not influence the incumbent’s critical project θ1I .
For simple equilibria, Proposition 2 directly shows how the parameters affect the prob-
ability of discovering an innovation. The result suggests several policy levers which can
be used to promote innovation. First, by (a), strengthening the bargaining position of
the entrant fosters variety. One practical way to achieve this is to make it easier or less
costly for the entrant to enforce his IP rights. Second, by (b) and (c), any policy which
increases the entrant’s duopoly profits and lowers those of the incumbent has a positive
effect on innovation. This suggests that stricter competition policy, which makes it harder
for incumbents to abuse dominance, can foster innovation. Moreover, this result provides
support for innovation policies targeting small firms such as preferential R&D tax credits
and subsidized loans (see Bloom et al., 2019). While the usual rationale for such policies is
that small firms are more likely to face financial constraints, our analysis shows that, even
in the absence of such constraints, targeting small firms can foster innovation by increasing
the variety of R&D projects which are pursued in equilibrium.
21Recall that simple equilibria always exist under laissez-faire. Furthermore, one can show that only
simple equilibria exist with an alternative time structure where the incumbent moves first.
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5 Prohibiting Acquisitions
We now analyze the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. In Section 5.1, we show
that such a policy reduces the equilibrium project variety and the probability of innovation.
Section 5.2 analyzes how the size of this negative effect depends on the market environment.
In Section 5.3, we discuss R&D duplication. Throughout the section, we denote the critical
values under the laissez-faire and no-acquisition policies as θki (A) and θki (N), k ∈ {1, 2},
respectively.
5.1 The Effects on Variety
Firm behavior in the commercialization and market stages remains unchanged when ac-
quisitions are prohibited. By Lemma 1, such a policy affects the outcome only when
the entrant has a non-drastic innovation. Analogously to the laissez-faire case, in any
equilibrium (rNI , rNE ) of the no-acquisition regime the firms invest in all projects below
max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}, but in no other projects.22 Hence, variety in this regime is given by
VN = max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}. Since by Corollary 1 variety in any laissez-faire equilibrium
is VA = max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)}, the size of the policy effect on variety is ∆V := VA − VN =
max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)} − max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}. Our next result characterizes the sign of this
effect.
Proposition 3. Consider the no-acquisition policy.
(i) In any equilibrium, (a) the variety of research projects is weakly smaller than in
any equilibrium under laissez-faire and (b) the probability of an innovation is weakly
smaller than in any simple equilibrium under laissez-faire.
(ii) The inequalities in (i) are strict, except that there is no effect on variety in the case
with commercialization if θ1E(A) ≤ θ1I (A).
Proposition 3 shows that a restrictive acquisition policy never increases variety. How-
ever, (ii) highlights a crucial difference between the cases with and without commercial-
ization. While the policy effect is strictly negative in the killer acquisitions case, it may
be zero in the case with commercialization.
Two simple observations are critical for the intuition. First, θ1E(N) < θ1E(A): In-
tuitively, prohibiting acquisitions reduces the entrant’s expected payoff from R&D in-
vestments, since he cannot sell the firm when it would be profitable to do so. Second,
θ1I (A) = θ
1
I (N) =: θ
1
I : If the entrant does not invest in the correct project, there will be no
reason to acquire him, so that the policy regime is irrelevant for θ1I . Only three possible
orderings for θ1I and the entrant’s critical projects θ1E(A) and θ1E(N) are compatible with
these two observations:
(I) θ1I < θ1E(N) < θ1E(A)
(II) θ1E(N) ≤ θ1I < θ1E(A)
(III) θ1E(N) < θ1E(A) ≤ θ1I .
22We provide a full characterization of the equilibria under the no-acquisition policy in Propositions
A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.4.
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When (I) or (II) applies, θ1E(A), which reflects the entrant’s incentives, determines the
equilibrium variety under laissez-faire. A ban on acquisitions weakens these incentives and
therefore reduces variety to θ1E(N) under ordering (I) or to θ1I under (II). Figure 2(I) and
2(II) illustrate these two cases, respectively. When (III) applies, θ1I determines the equi-
librium variety in both policy regimes. Hence, as illustrated in Figure 2(III), a prohibition
of acquisitions has no effect. Importantly, in the case without commercialization, ordering
(I) always applies, so that the policy effect is strict in this case.
Furthermore, since in any equilibrium P(rI , rE) ≤ V(rI , rE), while in any simple equi-
librium P(rI , rE) = V(rI , rE), the statement in Proposition 3 on innovation probabilities






















Figure 2: The effect of prohibiting acquisitions on project variety.
5.2 The Size of the Effect on Variety
As an input into our subsequent welfare analysis, we analyze how the market environ-
ment determines the size of the innovation-reducing effect of restricting acquisitions. In
particular, our results highlight the importance of bargaining power and the intensity of
competition in the market.
Proposition 4. Consider any equilibrium under a laissez-faire policy (rAI , rAE) and any
equilibrium under the no-acquisition policy (rNI , rNE ).
(i) The size of the policy effect ∆V is (a) weakly increasing in entrant bargaining power
β, (b) weakly decreasing in the incumbent’s profits under competition π(`, L) and (c)
strictly decreasing in the entrant’s profits under competition π(L, `) if θ1I < θ1E(N),
but weakly increasing if θ1E(N) < θ1I .
(ii) The effects in (i) are strict if θ1I < θ1E(A) and they are zero if θ1I > θ1E(A).
This central result identifies the circumstances under which the innovation effect is
important. To understand it, recall that in both policy regimes the variety of research
projects is determined by the most expensive project some firm is willing to invest in, so
that ∆V = max{θ1E(A), θ1I}−max{θ1E(N), θ1I}. Thus, the effect of a parameter on the loss
of variety is equivalent to its effect on the difference between these critical projects.
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An increase in the entrant’s bargaining power β increases his share of the acquisition
surplus and thus his payoff in case of an acquisition. Hence, it increases θ1E(A). However,
the change affects neither θ1E(N) (since acquisitions are not allowed) nor θ1I (since there
is no acquisition if the entrant does not innovate). Combining these observations, for
orderings (I) and (II), an increase in β strictly increases ∆V , as it increases θ1E(A) without
affecting θ1E(N) and θ1I . For ordering (III), an increase in β has no effect, as it does not
change θ1I .23
Next, an increase in the incumbent’s profits under competition π(`, L) neither affects
θ1E(N) nor θ1I , but it reduces the acquisition surplus and therefore decreases θ1E(A). The
overall effect is a strict reduction in ∆V for orderings (I) and (II), and no effect for ordering
(III). Finally, the effect of an increase in the entrant’s duopoly profit π(L, `) is more subtle.
π(L, `) increases both θ1E(A) and θ1E(N), but the increase is greater for θ1E(N).24 For
ordering (I), the overall effect is therefore a strict decrease in ∆V . Since π(L, `) does not
affect θ1I , this implies a strict increase in ∆V for ordering (II) and no effect for (III).
As the case without commercialization satisfies ordering (I), where the effects are strict,
whereas ordering (III) may arise only with commercialization, these arguments again high-
light the importance of distinguishing these two cases.
To summarize, Proposition 4 shows how the loss of variety depends on bargaining power
and the intensity of potential competition as captured by duopoly profits. This result is a
useful ingredient in the welfare analysis, as it identifies circumstances in which competition
authorities can implement a more restrictive acquisition policy without substantial negative
effects on innovation. However, the welfare analysis remains incomplete without discussing
the effects of the market environment on consumer surplus, an issue to which we return
in Section 6.1.
5.3 The Effect on Duplication
The acquisition policy not only affects variety and thereby the probability of innovation,
but also the firms’ incentives to duplicate research projects. Contrary to the laissez-faire
case, duopolistic competition arises after a non-drastic innovation of the entrant. This
affects the critical values θ2I and θ2E.
Corollary 2. (i) θ2I (N) > θ2(A) and (ii) θ2(A) > θ2E(N).
Thus, prohibiting acquisitions increases the incumbent’s duplication incentives and
decreases those of the entrant. Intuitively, (i) if the entrant invests in a project, the
incumbent gains more from duplicating it under a no-acquisition policy than under laissez-
faire: Without the acquisition option, own investments that duplicate entrant’s research
are the only means of preventing competitive entry. As to the entrant, (ii) duplicating
the incumbent’s investments is less attractive under the no-acquisition policy than under
laissez-faire because of the absence of prospective gains from selling the firm. We discuss
the complex net effects of these policy reactions in Proposition B.1 in Online Appendix
23This argument, and the one in the next paragraph, applies when orderings (II) and (III) are strict.
When θ1I is equal to one of the entrant’s critical projects, the matters are more subtle, but the intuition
is similar. See the proof for details.
24The reason for this is that when acquisitions are allowed, an increase in π(L, `) increases the entrant’s
outside option, but decreases the acquisition surplus. This countervailing effect is absent when acquisitions
are not allowed, leading to a larger overall increase in θ1E(N).
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B.1. If θ2I (N) ≤ θ1I , then the negative policy effect on the entrant’s incentives dominates
and there is less duplication under the no-acquisition policy. If θ1I < θ2I (N), this conclusion
only holds if the entrant’s bargaining power β is sufficiently high. The reason is that his
reaction only dominates if the entrant is relatively more affected by the policy compared
to the incumbent. In turn, if β is low, the incumbent is relatively more affected and thus
overall duplication increases.
To summarize, the fact that we are investigating investment portfolios rather than just
overall investment efforts allow us to identify the effects of a ban on start-up acquisitions on
the duplication incentives of incumbents and entrants. Because the no-acquisition policy
affects duplication, a negative effect of the policy on innovation probability may go hand
in hand with a positive effect on R&D effort.
6 Discussion and Further Results
We now provide additional results and discuss the robustness of our findings. Section 6.1
deals with consumer surplus effects. In Section 6.2, we compare our analysis with a more
standard model where firms cannot target specific innovation projects. Finally, in Section
6.3 we show that our analysis is robust to various changes in the modelling assumptions.
6.1 Consumer Surplus Effects
We now ask under which circumstances the well-known positive competition effect of pro-
hibiting acquisitions dominates the negative innovation effect from a consumer perspective.
We focus on the case without commercialization.25
We denote consumer surplus when the entrant competes with technology L against the
incumbent as S(`, L), and as S(t) for a monopoly with technology t ∈ {`,H}.26 We assume
that S(H) > S(`, L) > S(`). Thus, consumers prefer the high-state monopoly to the
duopoly, which they prefer to the low-state monopoly in turn. We denote the probability
of a duopoly in policy regime R as probR(`, L) and the probability of a monopoly with
technology t ∈ {`,H} as probR(t).27 Then, the expected consumer surplus under laissez-
faire is:
probA (H)S (H) + probA (`)S (`) .
Under the no-acquisition policy, the expected consumer surplus is:
probN (H)S (H) + probN (`, L)S (`, L) + probN (`)S (`) .
The following result gives a simple condition under which the competition effect dominates
the innovation effect from a consumer perspective.
25For the case with commercialization, such an analysis is not necessary for θ1E(A) ≤ θ1I (A), because
then there is no innovation effect by Proposition 3. If θ1E(A) > θ
1
I (A), the analysis and the insights for the
cases with and without commercialization are similar. However, since the decomposition of the welfare
effect is more involved in the former case, we focus on the killer acquisition case.
26Note that, while only the incumbent can be a monopolist with technology `, both incumbent and
entrant may end up with an H monopoly in both regimes.
27Note that these probabilities follow directly from the equilibrium innovation strategies (rI , rE), char-
acterized in Propositions 1, A.2 and A.3.
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Proposition 5. Suppose the no-commercialization case applies. Prohibiting start-up ac-
quisitions increases the expected consumer surplus if and only if
probN (`, L) [S (`, L)− S (`)] >
[
probA (H)− probN (H)
]
[S (H)− S (`)] .
The proposition illustrates the countervailing effects of prohibiting acquisitions. On
the one hand, the policy measure introduces desirable competition (and potentially better
technology) with probability probN(`, L), leading to a competitive surplus S (`, L) rather
than the non-competitive surplus S (`). On the other hand, the measure reduces the
probability of a drastic innovation (which would increase consumer surplus from S(`) to
S(H)) by probA (H)−probN (H). Note that S (H)−S (`) depends on the size of the drastic
innovation and, closely related, on its effect on demand, whereas S (`, L)− S (`) captures
the consumer value of duopolistic competition. Both terms are independent of the firms’
investment decisions. By contrast, probN(`, L) is the product of the entrant’s endogenous
innovation probability under the no-acquisition policy and the conditional probability 1−p
that this innovation is non-drastic. probA (H) − probN (H) is the product of the effect of
the acquisition policy on the probability of an innovation success (see Section 4) and the
conditional probability p that an innovation is drastic.
These general considerations lead to some insights into the determinants of the con-
sumer surplus effect. Assuming that the effect on probability corresponds to the effect
on variety (see the discussion of Proposition 3(b)), an increase in the entrant’s bargain-
ing power β increases probA (H) − probN (H) and thus the adverse innovation effect of a
restrictive acquisition policy; there is no such effect when β = 0.28 Therefore, a restric-
tive acquisition policy will always be justified for sufficiently low bargaining power of the

















Figure 3: Effect of prohibiting acquisitions on consumer surplus based on a parameterized
example of Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods (See Online Appendix B.4).
By contrast, whether prohibiting acquisitions increases or decreases consumer surplus
depends on product market competition in an ambiguous way. According to Proposition
28Remember that the extent to which the policy induces desirable competition only depends on the
entrant’s innovation probability under no-acquisition, which is independent of β.
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4, in the case without commercialization an exogenous reduction in the entrant’s duopoly
profits π(L, `) tends to increase the size of the adverse innovation effect. However, such
a change in the market environment may reflect more intense competitive interaction
between the firms and therefore a higher consumer surplus S(`, L) relative to the monopoly
case. Thus whether a reduction in the entrant’s duopoly profits makes a positive consumer
surplus effect of prohibiting acquisitions more or less likely is not clear without considering
special parameterized models. Similar arguments apply to the incumbent’s duopoly profits.
We analyze these ambiguities in a standard heterogeneous Bertrand model with linear
demand (à la Shapley-Shubik). Figure 3 shows that, in line with our comparative statics
result for the killer acquisition case (see Proposition 4), prohibiting acquisitions has a
positive effect on consumer surplus only if the bargaining power of the entrant is small
and competition intensity on the product market is not too intense.29
Our focus on consumer surplus in this welfare discussion reflects the common practice
of many competition agencies. That said, extending the analysis beyond this welfare
standard may well be interesting. For instance, the discussion of duplication in Section
5.3 suggests further channels by which the acquisition policy can affect welfare.
6.2 One-dimensional Innovation Efforts
We now briefly discuss an alternative setting where firms can only choose total innovation
efforts rather than which projects to invest in (see Appendix B.2 for details). This one-
dimensional model differs from our main model only in how innovation probabilities are
determined. We assume that both firms exert R&D effort, which determines the probability
of innovation success independently across firms. The analysis of the acquisition and
commercialization stages applies as before. As the incumbent acquires the entrant only if
the latter has discovered a non-drastic innovation, the effect of prohibiting acquisitions is
driven by the differences in firm values in this situation.
For similar reasons as in our main model, prohibiting acquisitions reduces the entrant’s
investment incentives. Conversely, prohibiting acquisitions increases the incumbent’s in-
vestment incentives, as she can no longer use acquisitions to avoid competition. Thus, she
has a higher incentive to block the entrant by own investments. The effect of prohibiting
acquisitions on innovation probability thus depends on the relative magnitudes of changes
in the firms’ incentives and can either be positive or negative.
This ambiguous effect results from the restrictive model structure and in particular the
assumption that firms cannot affect the correlation between the outcomes of their R&D
activities. The only way the incumbent can decrease the probability that the entrant
receives the patent in this simplified model is to increase overall R&D spending. This, in
turn, by assumption leads to an increase in the overall probability that the innovation is
discovered. As our previous analysis shows, this relationship does not necessarily have to
hold. If firms increase their investments by duplicating the efforts of other firms, then the
probability that the innovation is discovered does not necessarily increase.
29Here, the intensity of competition corresponds to the degree of substitution between the goods, with
higher intensity (i.e. higher substitutability between goods) leading to lower duopoly profits. The details
of the model and our calculations can be found in Appendix B.4.
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6.3 Robustness
We now show the robustness of our results with respect to uncertainty about the entrant’s
innovation level, asymmetries between firms as well as multiple entrants. Appendix B.3
contains formal results and proofs.
6.3.1 Innovation Uncertainty at the Time of Acquisition
In our model, before entering acquisition negotiations, both firms know whether the in-
novation is drastic or not. In practice, it may often be difficult to evaluate the start-up’s
technology level. Extensive testing may be necessary to identify cost savings or qual-
ity improvements. In this section, we show that the policy effects remain similar if the
technology level of an innovation is uncertain at the time of the acquisition.
We maintain the setting of Section 3, but assume that only the correct project is re-
vealed at the end of the investment stage, not its technology level. Thus, before the acqui-
sition stage, interim technology states (tintI , tintE ) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} are realized, where
1 indicates that the firm received a patent and 0 indicates that it did not. After the acqui-
sition stage, the technology level of the correct project is realized as L or H. Thereafter,
firms decide on commercialization, before the final technology states (tfinI , t
fin
E ) ∈ T are
realized. Everything else remains as before. Proposition B.2 in Appendix B.3.1 shows that,
irrespective of the policy regime, uncertainty does not affect equilibrium investments and
thus does not change the policy effect. However, uncertainty does influence the frequency
of acquisitions. The incumbent will acquire the entrant irrespective of the technology level
of the latter’s innovation because the expected surplus at the time is positive, since it is
a convex combination of a positive acquisition surplus in case of the L technology and no
acquisition surplus in case of the H technology.
6.3.2 Asymmetric Chances of Receiving Patents
We now show that the variety of pursued investment projects is invariant to the assumption
that, if both firms discover an innovation, they each have an equal chance to receive the
patent. Let the probability of receiving the patent (when both firms discover an innovation)
be ρI ∈ (0, 1) for the incumbent and thus (1 − ρI) for the entrant.30 Proposition B.3 in
Appendix B.3.2 shows that, regardless of ρI , banning acquisitions reduces the variety of
pursued research projects and thereby the probability that an innovation will be discovered.
Furthermore, the size of the policy effect is independent of ρI . Therefore, the results on
the relation between parameters and the size of the policy effect identified in Proposition
4 are also robust to changes in ρI . This result holds because ρI matters only when both
firms discover an innovation. Thus, it affects duplication incentives, but not the incentives
to invest in projects in which the competitor is not investing. Since variety is given by
max{θ1E, θ1I}, it is not affected by ρI in either policy regime, so that the size of the policy
effect does not depend on ρI .
6.3.3 Heterogeneous Commercialization Costs
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that both firms would face the same commercial-
ization cost κ. However, due to a better infrastructure or a more developed sales network,
30The main model corresponds to ρI = 1/2.
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the incumbent might be able to commercialize the innovation at a lower cost. To capture
this possibility, we denote the commercialization costs of the incumbent and the entrant
with κI and κE, respectively, where κI < κE. Adjusting Assumption 2, we assume that (i)
π(L, `) ≥ κE and π(H)−π(`, 0) ≥ κI . We focus on the no-commercialization case, so that
π(L, 0) − π(`, 0) < κI . We add the innocuous assumption that π(L, `) ≤ π(L, 0), which
requires that a monopolist with an L technology obtains market profits at least as high as
a firm with L technology which competes with a firm with technology `.31 Generalizing
Proposition 3, Proposition B.4 in Appendix B.3.3 shows that banning acquisitions reduces
the variety of research projects, which tends to reduce the innovation probability. More-
over, in this setting, a prohibition of acquisitions results in an additional inefficiency, as it
forces the entrant to commercialize the technology using the cost κE instead of letting the
incumbent commercialize it at the lower cost κI .
6.3.4 Multiple Entrants
We argue briefly, without going into details of equilibrium existence and characterization,
that the effects of a restrictive acquisition policy on innovation do not change substantially
when there are multiple entrants, even though the analysis becomes more complex. We
focus on the case without commercialization, assuming there are two entrants.
Compared with the main model, the analysis changes mainly because the firms need to
take into account the possibility that two (potential) competitors invest in some project,
which reduces the probability of obtaining a patent. To capture the willingness to invest
in such projects, we define critical projects θ3i in a similar way as θ1i and θ2i . Clearly,
θ3i < θ
2
i , reflecting the lower probability of obtaining a patent when three rather than two
firms invest. Crucially, however, the number of entrants does not affect the critical values
θ1i and θ2i . Therefore, the highest critical value is still θ1E, no matter which policy regime
applies. Moreover, in any equilibrium of the game, for any project θ ≤ θ1E there must exist
at least one firm investing a positive amount in this project: Otherwise one of the entrants
could profitably deviate by investing a positive amount. Thus, as in the main model, the
entrants’ critical projects determine variety. Therefore, the policy effect on variety remains
the same with multiple entrants as with a single entrant.32
7 Conclusion
Recently, there has been an intense debate on the interactions between mergers and inno-
vation, with particular emphasis on start-up acquisitions. Motivated by this debate, our
paper provides a theory of the strategic choice of innovation projects by incumbents and
start-ups which allows for endogenous acquisition and commercialization decisions.
Very generally, both firms invest as much as possible into low-cost projects, whereas
neither invests at all in high-cost projects. For projects with intermediate costs, at least
one firm invests. This structure is independent of whether acquisitions are allowed or not
and whether the incumbent commercializes the entrant’s innovation after an acquisition or
not. We find that prohibiting start-up acquisitions weakly reduces the variety of research
31We do not rely on this natural assumption in the main model, which is why we only add it here.
32One difference is that, with multiple entrants, equilibria cannot be unique: For projects just below
θ1E , both entrants will want to invest if and only if no other firm has invested.
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projects pursued and thereby the probability of discovering innovations, and it may induce
the incumbent to strategically duplicate projects of the entrant to prevent competition.
Our analysis reveals conditions under which a restrictive acquisition policy is called
for. It turns out that the negative innovation effect of prohibiting acquisitions may well
be absent for innovations with sufficient commercialization potential. Even for less at-
tractive innovations that the incumbent would not want to commercialize, the adverse
innovation effects may be negligible if the entrant has low bargaining power and the in-
cumbent’s duopoly profits are high, so that the competition-enhancing effect of prohibiting
acquisitions is likely to dominate in this case.
While our analysis covers several interesting aspects of start-up acquisitions, it leaves
some issues untouched. For instance, we focus on incumbents’ takeovers of would-be
entrants into a market where the incumbent is already present. Our analysis does not
directly apply to the equally interesting case where an incumbent in one market acquires
a start-up that has recently entered a related market which the incumbent cannot serve
with his existing technology.
Moreover, our approach focuses on the short run policy effects. Going beyond our static
model, acquisitions with commercialization might give rise to concerns that arise only in
the longer term. For instance, rather than merely killing a potential entrant, the incumbent
can combine the knowledge of the two firms to expand its technological lead. This is likely
to restrict potential competition in the long term by reducing incentives for innovation.33
It would be interesting to analyze how incumbents and potential entrants target their
innovation activities when entry can take place repeatedly and the incumbent’s technology
improves as a result of acquisitions. Is increasing dominance of the incumbent an inevitable
outcome? Will the innovation process eventually slow down because it becomes too hard
for entrants to compete? While these questions are beyond the scope of the current paper,
our analysis suggests that to answer them it would be expedient to take the policy effects
on project choice into account, rather than only the effects on the overall innovation level.
33This argument is reminiscent of Cabral (2018).
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A Appendix
This appendix provides proofs of our formal results as well as a full description of equilibria
under the policy (Propositions A.2 and A.3). It is organized as follows. Section A.1
provides the proof of Lemma 1, which describes the equilibrium of the acquisition game.
Section A.2 collects the results on the order of critical projects. It contains the proof of
Lemma 3, as well as the statement and proof of Lemma A.1, which characterizes the order
of critical projects under the policy. With these results in place, we then characterize every
equilibrium for each conceivable constellation of critical projects (see Section A.3). Section
A.4 provides the statement of Propositions A.2 and A.3. The proofs of Propositions 1,
A.2 and A.3 can be found in Section A.5. These proofs are straightforward implications
of the results in Section A.3. Finally, Section A.6 collects all the remaining proofs (of
Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 5).
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider first the commercialization subgame. The entrant commercializes a technology
if the payoff from doing so is at least zero. Since π(L, `) ≥ κ by Assumption 2(i) and
π(H) ≥ κ by Assumptions 1(i) and 2(ii), the entrant commercializes both technologies.
The incumbent commercializes a technology if the payoff of doing so is at least π(`, 0).
Since π(H) − κ ≥ π(`, 0) by Assumption 2(ii), the incumbent always commercializes the
H technology. The incumbent commercializes the L technology if and only if π(L, 0) −
π(`, 0) ≥ κ.
Now consider the acquisitions subgame. There are three possible cases. Either the
entrant holds no patent, or he holds the H patent or the L patent. We will examine the
three cases in turn. First, suppose that the entrant holds no patent. Then, since the
entrant cannot compete without an innovation, the incumbent’s profits are the same with
or without the acquisition. Thus, the incumbent has no reason to acquire the entrant.
Second, suppose the entrant holds a patent on the H technology. Without an acquisition,
the entrant commercializes the technology and obtains the payoff π(H) − κ while the
incumbent obtains π(`,H) = 0. With the acquisition, the incumbent commercializes
the technology and obtains the payoff π(H) − κ. Thus the total payoffs are equal with
or without the acquisition. Since the acquisition (by assumption) only goes through if
the total payoffs strictly increase, the incumbent does not acquire the entrant. Third,
consider the case when the entrant has a patent for the L technology. If there is no
acquisition, the entrant commercializes the technology and obtains payoffs π(L, `) − κ,
while the incumbent’s payoffs are π(`, L). If the incumbent acquires the entrant and
commercializes the technology, she obtains π(L, 0) − κ, while without commercialization
she obtains π(`, 0). Thus she will choose to commercialize only if π(L, 0)−κ ≥ π(`, 0). The
incumbent’s payoff is max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)}, while the entrant obtains a payoff of zero.
Consequently, the acquisition surplus is positive if and only if max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} >
π(L, `) + π(`, L) − κ. We can add κ to both sides of the inequality and use Assumption
1(iv) to show that this inequality indeed holds:
max{π(L, 0), π(`, 0) + κ} ≥ max{π(L, 0), π(`, 0)} > π(L, `) + π(`, L).
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A.2 Characterization of the order of critical projects
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The result will follow immediately from Steps 1 and 2 below.
Step 1: (a) θ2I = θ2E and (b) θ2E < θ1E.












[pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)] = C(θ2E)
(b) Since C(θ2E) < C(θ1E), part (b) of Step 1 follows immediately.
Step 2: In the case without commercialization, only θ1I < θ1E is possible.
To see this, note that in cases without commercialization, max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} =
π(`, 0) has to hold, so that vI(L, 0) = vI(`, 0). Then θ1I < θ1E if and only if:
C(θ1I ) < C(θ
1
E)
pvI(H) + (1− p)vI(L, 0)− vI(`, 0) < pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)
(1− p)vI(L, 0)− vI(`, 0) < (1− p)vE(L, `)
−pvI(`, 0) < (1− p)vE(L, `),
which always holds.
A.2.2 Critical Projects under a No-acquisition Policy
Lemma A.1. Consider the no-acquisition policy.
(i) In the case without commercialization, the following relations hold:
(a) θ2E < θ2I ; (b) θ2E < θ1E; (c) θ1I < θ1E.
(ii) In the case with commercialization, the following relations hold:
(a) θ2E < θ2I ; (b) θ2E < θ1E.
Proof. Note that (a) and (b) are the same in the case with and without commercialization.
We prove them without distinguishing between the cases.






(pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)) <
1
2
(pvI(H) + (1− p)(vI(L, 0)− vI(`, L)))
vE(L, `) < vI(L, 0)− vI(`, L)
π(L, `)− κ < max{π(`, 0), π(L, 0)− κ} − π(`, L)
which is satisfied by Assumption 1(iv).
(b): Since C(θ2E) < C(θ1E), it follows immediately that θ2E < θ1E.
For (c), we restrict attention to the case without commercialization.
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(c): Consider the case without commercialization. The claim will hold if and only if
C(θ1I ) < C(θ
1
E)
pvI(H) + (1− p)vI(L, 0)− vI(`, 0) < pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)
−pvI(`, 0) < (1− p)vE(L, `)
where the equivalence of the last two lines follows from vI(L, 0) = vI(`, 0), which always
holds in the case without commercialization, and Assumption 1(i).
A.3 Characterization of Equilibrium Behavior
As an immediate implication of Lemmas 3 and A.1, we find two relations which hold in
all cases we consider.
Corollary A.1. Irrespective of policy, the following relations hold:
(i) θ1E > θ2E
(ii) θ2I ≥ θ2E.
Next, for all orderings which satisfy the conditions of Corollary A.1, we characterize





E and θ2I .
Proposition A.1. Any equilibrium must satisfy (a)-(f) below. If (a)-(f) all hold, the
investment functions rE(θ) and rI(θ) can be sustained as an equilibrium.
(a) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1 whenever θ ∈ [0, θ2E]
(b) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0 whenever θ ∈ (max{θ1I , θ1E}, 1)











whenever θ ∈ (max{θ1I , θ2E},min{θ1E, θ2I}].












whenever θ ∈ (θ2I ,min{θ1I , θ1E}].
(f) The equilibrium satisfies rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1 in all remaining cases.
Proof. (a) Projects in this interval are (weakly) profitable for the entrant irrespective of the
behavior of the incumbent since θ ≤ θ2E < θ1E by Corollary A.1(i). Given that the entrant
invests, investing is also profitable for the incumbent, as θ ≤ θ2I by Corollary A.1(ii).
Consequently, investment behavior on this interval is consistent with an equilibrium if and
only if rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1.
(b) Projects in this interval are never profitable for the entrant irrespective of the
behavior of the incumbent since θ2E < θ1E < θ by Corollary A.1(i). As the entrant does not
invest, investment is not profitable for the incumbent as θ > θ1I .
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(c) In this interval, it is a unique best response of the incumbent not to invest irrespec-
tive of the investment of the entrant. Therefore, using θ ≤ θ1E, it is always a unique best
response of the entrant to choose rI(θ) = 1.
(d) By now straightforward considerations, there can be no equilibrium where firms
choose zero or maximal investment (on a positive measure of projects). Thus, any equi-
librium must involve firms choosing strictly interior equilibrium efforts. However, since
project payoffs are linear in effort, interior equilibrium efforts can only be sustained when
each firm makes the rival exactly indifferent between investing and not investing into a
given project. The incumbent is indifferent if and only if
(1− rE(θ))vI(`, 0) + rE(θ)(1− p)vI(`, L) =




[pvI(H) + (1− p) (vI(L, 0) + vI(`, L))]
where the LHS represents the incumbent’s project payoff from investing 0 and the RHS
represents the incumbent’s project payoff from investing 1.





, which is the unique solution to the above equation. We can proceed analogously





. Moreover, these investment levels are feasible, since they
are between 0 and 1 for every θ ∈ (max{θ1I , θ2E},min{θ2I , θ1E}]. Thus, effort levels rE and
rI for each project θ in this interval are consistent with equilibrium behavior if and only
if they are defined as in (d).
(e) It is simple to show that the strategies delineated in (i) and (ii) constitute equilib-
rium behavior and that no other equilibrium with minimal or maximal effort choices exists.
Proceeding as in (d), we find that the strategy in (iii) is also consistent with equilibrium
behavior for θ in this interval, and there is no other strategy with interior effort levels for
which this is the case.
(f) In (a)-(e), we have shown that, if θ lies in the given interval for each of the cases,
we arrive at the respective equilibrium behavior for project θ.
We now show that in all remaining cases one of the following must hold:
(i) θ ∈ (θ2E,min{θ1I , θ2I}] and min{θ1I , θ2I} < θ1E
(ii) θ ∈ (max{θ2I , θ1E}, θ1I ]
(iii) θ ∈ (θ2E, θ1I ] and min{θ1I , θ2I} ≥ θ1E
All equilibria satisfy (a) and (b), but which ones of the remaining cases apply in the
interval (θ2E,max{θ1I , θ1E} depends on the exact order of critical projects. We will thus
consider each case (c)-(f) in turn and show that, if there are still intervals not covered,
they fall into at least one of the listed cases:
Assuming case (c) occurs, we need to characterize the possible constellations in the
interval (θ2E,max{θ2I , θ1I}]. (min{θ2I , θ1I},max{θ2I , θ1I}] corresponds to case (d) if θ1I ≤ θ2I
and to case (e) if θ1I > θ2I . Thus, we are left with the interval (θ2E,min{θ1I , θ2I}], which is
case (i) above.
Assuming case (d) occurs, we need to characterize the possible constellations in the
intervals (θ2E,max{θ1I , θ2E}] and (min{θ1E, θ2I}, θ1E]. Since (min{θ1E, θ2I}, θ1E] only has positive
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measure if θ2I < θ1E, the interval falls into case (c). (θ2E,max{θ1I , θ2E}] only has positive
measure if θ2E < θ1I , and then the interval corresponds to case (i) above.
Assuming case (e) occurs, we need to characterize the possible constellations in the
intervals (θ2E, θ2I ] and (min{θ1I , θ1E}, (max{θ1I , θ1E}]. For the second interval, if θ1I < θ1E, we
are in case (c) and if θ1I ≥ θ1E, we are in case (ii) above. (θ2E, θ2I ] corresponds to case (i)
above.
Cases (c), (d) and (e) all require min{θ1I , θ2I} < θ1E. Assuming that min{θ1I , θ2I} ≥ θ1E
implies that neither (c), (d) or (e) occurs. Case (iii) above therefore covers the whole
interval (θ2E, θ1I ]. Moreover, if min{θ1I , θ2I} < θ1E, at least one of the three cases, (c), (d) or
(e), occurs and thus there are no cases left to consider.
Having established that we identified the remaining cases, we can use arguments that
are standard by now to show that efforts in each of those cases are consistent with equi-
librium behavior if and only if rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1.
A.4 Equilibria under a No-acquisition Policy
We now state equilibrium characterizations for the no-acquisition policy (first for the case
without commercialization, then for the case with commercialization). The proofs are in
Section A.5.
Proposition A.2 (Without commercialization). Consider the case without commercial-
ization under a no-acquisition policy.
(a) If θ2I ≥ θ1I , then max{θ1I , θ2E} ≤ min{θ2I , θ1E}. The equilibrium is unique. Functions
rI and rE constitute an equilibrium if and only if conditions (i)-(v) hold:
(i) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ [0, θ2E]












for θ ∈ (max{θ1I , θ2E},min{θ2I , θ1E}],
(iv) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (min{θ2I , θ1E}, θ1E],
(v) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1E, 1).
(b) If θ2I < θ1I then θ2E < θ2I < θ1I < θ1E. The equilibrium is not unique. Functions rI and
rE constitute an equilibrium if and only if conditions (i)-(v) hold:
(i) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ [0, θ2E]
(ii) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ (θ2E, θ2I ]
(iii) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1I , θ1E],
(iv) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1E, 1).
(v) for any θ ∈ (θ2I , θ1I ] either:
rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, or













Proposition A.3 (With commercialization). Consider the case with commercialization
under a no-acquisition policy.
(a) If θ2I ≥ θ1I , then max{θ1I , θ2E} ≤ min{θ2I , θ1E}. The equilibrium is unique. Functions
rI and rE constitute an equilibrium if and only if conditions (i)-(v) hold:
(i) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ [0, θ2E]












for θ ∈ (max{θ1I , θ2E},min{θ2I , θ1E}],
(iv) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (min{θ2I , θ1E}, θ1E],
(v) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1E, 1).
(b) If θ2I < θ1I < θ1E, then θ2E < θ2I < θ1I < θ1E. The equilibrium is not unique. Functions
rI and rE constitute an equilibrium if and only if conditions (i)-(v) hold:
(i) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ [0, θ2E]
(ii) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ (θ2E, θ2I ]
(iii) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1I , θ1E],
(iv) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1E, 1).
(v) for any θ ∈ (θ2I , θ1I ] either:
rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, or












(c) If θ2I < θ1E ≤ θ1I , then θ2E < θ2I < θ1E ≤ θ1I . The equilibrium is not unique. Functions
rI and rE constitute an equilibrium if and only if conditions (i)-(v) hold:
(i) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ [0, θ2E]
(ii) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ (θ2E, θ2I ]
(iii) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ (θ1E, θ1I ],
(iv) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1I , 1).
(v) for any θ ∈ (θ2I , θ1E] either:
rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 0, or












(d) If θ1E ≤ min{θ2I , θ1I}, then θ2E < θ1E ≤ min{θ1I , θ2I}. The equilibrium is unique. Func-
tions rI and rE constitute an equilibrium if and only if conditions (i)-(iii) hold:
(i) rE(θ) = 1 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ [0, θ2E]
(ii) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 1, for θ ∈ (θ2E, θ1I ]
(iii) rE(θ) = 0 and rI(θ) = 0, for θ ∈ (θ1I , 1).
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A.5 Proofs of Equilibrium Characterizations
A.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
According to Lemma 3, in the laissez-faire regime one of the following constellations applies:
(i) θ1I ≤ θ2 < θ1E (ii) θ2 < θ1I < θ1E (iii) θ2 < θ1E ≤ θ1I .
Applying Proposition A.1 to each constellation immediately gives the result.
A.5.2 Proof of Proposition A.2
According to Lemma A.1(a), under the no-acquisition policy in the case without commer-
cialization, one of the following five constellations applies:
(i) θ1I ≤ θ2E < θ2I ≤ θ1E (ii) θ1I ≤ θ2E < θ1E < θ2I (iii) θ2E < θ1I ≤ θ2I ≤ θ1E















Applying Proposition A.1 to each constellation immediately gives the result.
A.5.3 Proof of Proposition A.3
According to Lemma A.1(b), under the no-acquisitions policy in the case with commer-
cialization, one of the following constellations applies:
(i) θ1I ≤ θ2E < θ2I ≤ θ1E (ii) θ1I ≤ θ2E < θ1E < θ2I (iii) θ2E < θ1I ≤ θ2I ≤ θ1E
(iv) θ2E < θ
1
I ≤ θ1E < θ2I (v) θ2E < θ2I < θ1I ≤ θ1E (vi) θ2E < θ1E < θ1I ≤ θ2I
(vii) θ2E < θ
1
E ≤ θ2I < θ1I (viii) θ2E < θ2I < θ1E < θ1I .
Applying Proposition A.1 to each constellation immediately gives the result.
A.6 Other Proofs
A.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
By Corollary 1, V(rI , rE) = max{θ1E, θ1I} and since C is a strictly increasing function, the
sign of the effect of any parameter x on V(rI , rE) will be equal to the sign of its effect on
max {C(θ1E), C(θ1I )}.
Case 1: Suppose C(θ1I ) > C(θ1E) (and hence θ1I > θ1E). Since C(θ1I ) = p(π(H) − κ) +
(1− p) max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)}− π(`, 0), which does not depend on β, π(`, L) or π(L, `),
it follows immediately that
∂C(θ1I )/∂β = ∂C(θ
1
I )/∂π(`, L) = ∂C(θ
1
I )/∂π(L, `) = 0.
Case 2: Now suppose C(θ1I ) < C(θ1E) (and hence θ1I < θ1E). By definition C(θ1E) =
pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `) and by Lemma 2, we can substitute vE(H) and vE(L, `) so that
C(θ1E) = p(π(H)−κ)+(1−p)(β(max{π(L, 0)−κ, π(`, 0)}−π(`, L))+(1−β)(π(L, `)−κ)).








p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)(β(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L))+
(1− β)(π(L, `)− κ))
)
=
(1− p)(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)− π(L, `) + κ) > 0,






p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)(β(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L))+
(1− β)(π(L, `)− κ))
)
=






p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)(β(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L))+
(1− β)(π(L, `)− κ))
)
=
(1− p)(1− β) > 0.
Case 3: Finally, suppose C(θ1I ) = C(θ1E).
(a) Take β0, such that C(θ1I (β0)) = C(θ1E(β0)) (and hence θ1I (β0) = θ1E(β0)). Denoting
with ∂− and ∂+ the left and the right derivative (at β0), respectively, as well as using Step








































A.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Denote the equilibrium strategies under laissez-faire and the no-acquisition policy as
(rAI , r
A
E) and (rNI , rNE ), respectively. The result follows from Steps 1-5.
Step 1: VA = max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)} and VN = max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}.
The first claim holds because, by Proposition 1, rAI (θ) + rAE(θ) = 0 if and only if θ ∈
(max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)}, 1). Hence, VA = max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)}. The second claim holds be-
cause, by Propositions A.2 and A.3, rNI (θ)+rNE (θ) = 0 if and only if θ ∈ (max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}, 1).
Step 2: θ1I (A) = θ1I (N).
To show this, it is sufficient that C(θ1I (A)) = C(θ1I (N)), or equivalently
pvAI (H) + (1− p)vAI (L, 0)− vAI (`, 0) = pvNI (H) + (1− p)vNI (L, 0)− vNI (`, 0).
This holds since vAI (t, 0) = vNI (t, 0) for all t ∈ {`, L,H}.
Step 3: θ1E(N) < θ1E(A).
To show this, it is sufficient that C(θ1E(N)) < C(θ1E(A)) The claim requires that
pvNE (H) + (1− p)vNE (L, `) < pvAE(H) + (1− p)vAE(L, `).
This holds because
p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)(π(L, `)− κ) < p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)vAE(L, `)
π(L, `)− κ < vAE(L, `)
π(L, `)− κ < β(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)) + (1− β)(π(L, `)− κ)
π(L, `)− κ < max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)
where simple algebra leads to the last inequality, which holds by Assumption 1(iv).
Step 4: If θ1E(A) > θ1I (A), then VA > VN and if (rAI , rAE) is a simple equilibrium then
P(rAI , rAE) > P(rNI , rNE ).
Since θ1E(A) > θ1E(N) by Step 3 and θ1I (A) = θ1I (N) by Step 2, we obtain θ1E(A) >
max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}. Hence, VA > VN . Since P(rI , rE) ≤ V(rI , rE) for any (rI , rE) and
P(rI , rE) = V(rI , rE) for simple equilibria, then also P(rAI , rAE) > P(rNI , rNE ) if (rAI , rAE) is
a simple equilibrium.
Step 5: If θ1E(A) ≤ θ1I (A), then VA = VN and if (rAI , rAE) is a simple equilibrium then
P(rAI , rAE) ≥ P(rNI , rNE ).
If θ1E(A) ≤ θ1I (A), then by Steps 2 and 3, θ1E(N) < θ1I (N). Then VA = θ1I (A) = θ1I (N) =
VN . Since P(rI , rE) ≤ V(rI , rE) for any (rI , rE) and P(rI , rE) = V(rI , rE) for simple
equilibria, then also P(rAI , rAE) ≥ P(rNI , rNE ).
A.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 3(i) implies ∆V = VA − VN = max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)} −max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)} ≥ 0,
where θ1I (A) = θ1I (N) = θ1I and θ1E(A) > θ1E(N). We will analyze the change of ∆V as a
result of a change in β, π(`, L) and π(L, `) for all orderings of θ1I , θ1E(A) and θ1E(N). This
gives us the following five cases which we will examine in turn:
Case 1: θ1I < θ1E(N) < θ1E(A), Case 4: θ1E(N) = θ1I < θ1E(A),
Case 2: θ1E(N) < θ1I < θ1E(A), Case 5: θ1E(N) < θ1I = θ1E(A).
Case 3: θ1E(N) < θ1E(A) < θ1I ,
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The statement of the proposition aggregates the effects in these five cases.
Case 1: If θ1I < θ1E(N) < θ1E(A), then ∆V = θ1E(A) − θ1E(N). For any parameter x,











(p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)(π(L, `)− κ))
C ′(θ1E(N))
.




(1− p)(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)− π(L, `) + κ)
C ′(θ1E(A))
> 0
which follows from Assumption 1(iv).
















⇔ (1− β) < C
′(θ1E(A))
C ′(θ1E(N))
where the inequality follows from the convexity of C.











(p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p) max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, 0))
C ′(θ1I )
.




(1− p)(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)− π(L, `) + κ)
C ′(θ1E(A))
> 0
which follows from Assumption 1(iv).
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Case 3: If θ1E(N) < θ1E(A) < θ1I , ∆V = 0 and ∂∆V/∂x = 0 for x ∈ {β, π(`, L), π(L, `)}.
Case 4: If θ1E(N) = θ1I < θ1E(A), then ∆V = θ1E(A)−max{θ1I , θ1E(N)}. Provided that




Note that ∂θ1I/∂x = 0 and ∂θ1E(N)/∂x = 0 for x ∈ {β, π(`, L)}, which implies that the
derivative exists and ∂max{θ1I , θ1E(N)}/∂x = 0. Therefore, ∂∆V/∂β = ∂θ1E(A)/∂β > 0
and ∂∆V/∂π(`, L) = ∂θ1E(A)/∂π(`, L) < 0.
Case 5: If θ1E(N) < θ1I = θ1E(A), then ∆V = max{θ1I , θ1E(A)} − θ1I . Since ∂θ1I/∂x = 0
for x ∈ {β, π(`, L), π(L, `)}, the effect on variety is equal to the effect on max{θ1I , θ1E(A)}.
First, consider the effect of β. Note that ∂θ1E(A)/∂β > 0 and fix β0 such that θ1I (β0) =
θ1E(A, β0). Then for all β′ and β′′ such that β′ < β0 < β′′, we have θ1I (β′) > θ1E(A, β′) and
θ1I (β
′′) < θ1E(A, β
′′). Denoting with ∂− and ∂+ the left and the right derivative (at β0)








































A.6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Subtracting the two expressions for expected consumer surplus gives the welfare difference
probN (`, L)S (`, L) +
[
probN (H)− probA (H)
]
S (H) +[
probN (`)− probA (`)
]
S (`) =
probN (`, L) [S (`, L)− S (`)] +
[
probN (H)− probA (H)
]
S (H) +[
probN (`) + probN (`, L)− probA (`)
]
S (`)
The result then follows because
probN (`) + probN (`, L)− probA (`) = probA (H)− probN (H) .
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B Online Appendix
In this Appendix, we collect additional formal results and present parametric examples
for the curious reader. Specifically, in Section B.1, we evaluate the effect of prohibiting
acquisitions on duplication of innovation investment, as discussed towards the end of Sec-
tion 5. Section B.2 considers the one-dimensional model mentioned in Section 6.2, where
firms can choose total investment level. Formal results supporting the robustness claims
of Section 6.3 can be found in Section B.3. Finally, in Section B.4 we use a parameterized
model to depict the policy effects captured in Figure 3.
B.1 The Effect on Duplication
Duplication is measured by the probability that both firms discover the innovation:




We distinguish between equilibria where θ2I (N) ≤ θ1I (N) and equilibria where θ2I (N) >
θ1I (N).
Proposition B.1 (The effect of prohibiting start-up acquisitions on duplication).
(i) When θ2I (N) ≤ θ1I (N), duplication is strictly smaller in any simple equilibrium under
the no-acquisition policy than in any simple equilibrium under laissez-faire.
(ii) When θ2I (N) > θ1I (N), there exists a threshold bargaining power β̃ ∈ [0, 1) such that
in any equilibrium under the no-acquisition policy duplication is
(a) larger than in any simple equilibrium under laissez-faire if β < β̃, and
(b) smaller than in any simple equilibrium under laissez-faire if β > β̃.
Proof. (i) First note that, under the no-acquisition policy, simple equilibria only exist
when θ2I (N) ≤ θ1I (N). In any simple equilibrium under laissez-faire, D(rAI , rAE) = θ2(A) by
Proposition 1 and in any simple equilibrium under the no-acquisition policy D(rNI , rNE ) =
θ2E(N) by Proposition A.2. For θ2E(N) < θ2(A), we need
C(θ2E(N)) < C(θ
2(A))
vNE (L, `) < v
A
E(L, `)
π(L, `)− κ < β(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)) + (1− β)(π(L, `)− κ)
π(L, `)− κ < max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)
which holds by Assumption 1(iv). Hence D(rNI , rNE ) < D(rAI , rAE), which establishes part
(i) of the Proposition.
(ii) We need to consider duplication in any equilibrium under the no-acquisition policy.
When θ2I (N) > θ1I (N), only non-simple equilibria exist under the no-acquisition policy. In
these cases, by Proposition A.2, duplication is given by:









Now we show that there exists a threshold β̃ which determines the sign of the effect of
acquisitions on duplication. When β = 0, then θ2(A) = θ2E(N), thus







E (θ)dθ ≤ 0.
When β = 1, then θ2(A) = θ2I (N), thus








E (θ)dθ > 0.
The last inequality follows from the following two observations, which are implied by
Proposition A.2: (i) 0 ≤ min{θ2I (N), θ1E(N)}−max{θ2E(N), θ1I (N)} ≤ θ2I (N)− θ2E(N), and
(ii) rNI (θ)rNE (θ) ≤ 1 for all θ and rNI (θ)rNE (θ) < 1 for some θ. Finally, the effect of β on the
change in duplication is monotone:






(1− p)(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, L)− π(L, `) + κ)
C ′(θ2(A))
> 0.
The intuition for the result is the following: If θ2I (N) ≤ θ1I (N), and we only consider
simple equilibria in both regimes, then it is only the change in the entrant’s incentive to
invest in duplicate projects θ2E(N) which will determine the result. Similar to the effect on
variety, banning acquisitions also decreases the profitability of duplicate innovations for
the entrant, which leads to lower θ2E(N) and thus less duplication.
In the complementary case, θ2I (N) > θ1I (N), there exists a positive measure of projects
in which the incumbent invests only if this reduces the entrant’s probability of receiving
a patent on an L innovation. This creates additional duplication for more costly projects.
Allowing for acquisitions will reduce this duplication, while still increasing the duplication
for rather cheap projects as discussed in the previous paragraph. The overall effect of
allowing acquisitions then depends on the relative size of those countervailing effects, which
is determined by the bargaining power.
The above analysis identifies two distinct reasons for duplication: Duplication because
of high relative payoff of innovation, such that both investing in the same project still
pays off, and duplication due to the blocking incentives of the incumbent. The latter is
stronger when acquisitions are not allowed and, while duplication by the incumbent has the
negative side-effect of preventing the commercialization of a new L innovation and thereby
competition, conversely, duplication by the entrant has the positive side-effect of increasing
competition and can thus not only be considered as wasteful. However, even if duplication
might be decreased by allowing acquisitions, the positive side-effect of duplication by the
entrant is also shut down because his L innovation will just be acquired and will not lead
to more product market competition.
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B.2 One-dimensional Innovation Model
In this section we show that, in a model where firms only choose the amount of resources
they invest in research, banning acquisitions will have an ambiguous effect on innovations.
Let xi be the probability that the firm i ∈ {I, E} discovers the innovation, with the
associated cost given by K(·), where K is strictly increasing and convex. Apart from the
investment stage, the model is unchanged.
Profits and Best Responses The expected profit of the incumbent and the entrant,
given xI and xE, can be written as
EΠI(xI , xE) = xI(1−
1
2




xI)(1− p)vI(`, L) + (1− xI)(1− xE)vI(`, 0)−K(xI)
EΠE(xE, xI) = xE(1−
1
2
xI) [pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)]−K(xE).
Consequently, the first-order conditions and, implicitly, the best responses of the firms are




xE [pvI(H) + (1− p)(vI(L, 0)− vI(`, L))]
K ′(xE(xI)) = (1−
1
2
xI) [pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)]
The Nash equilibrium solves the above system of equations and is denoted by (x∗I , x∗E).34
Note that the values vI(tintI , tintE ) and vE(tintE , tintI ) are exactly the same as in the main
model and thus given by Lemma 2 for the laissez-faire regime. If acquisitions are prohib-
ited, the only terms changing in the above first-order conditions are vI(`, L) and vE(L, `).
Thus, we use superscripts to disentangle the different regimes: vAI (`, L) and vAE(L, `) in
laissez-faire and vNI (`, L) and vNE (L, `) in the no-acquisition policy, where vNI (`, L) = π(`, L)
and vNE (L, `) = π(L, `)− κ.
If acquisitions are prohibited, the incumbent’s payoff is lower when the entrant dis-
covers an innovation (compared to the case when acquisitions are allowed), increasing her
incentives to invest into R&D in order to drive out the entrant. However, the entrant
also receives lower profits when he obtains a non-drastic innovation, which reduces his
overall innovation incentives. Due to these counteracting effects, the net effect of a ban on
acquisitions on the sum of investment levels is not clear ex-ante.
Effect of Acquisitions on Innovation Probability We assume π(`, 0) > π(L, 0) −
κ, so that vI(L, 0) = vI(`, 0). To simplify the comparison between policy regimes, we
introduce a new parameter µ, where µ represents the probability that the acquisition will
be allowed. The first order conditions of the entrant and incumbent for a given regime µ
34Second order conditions are satisfied due to convexity of K(x).
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are given by:




xE(pvI(H) + (1− p)
[






xI)(pvE(H) + (1− p)
[
µvAE(L, `) + (1− µ)vNE (L, `)
]
).
The probability of an innovation, and its change when µ increases are given by:












We use the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions of the incumbent

























(1− x∗I(µ))(pvE(H) + (1− p)(µvAE(L, `) + (1− µ)vNE (L, `)))






pvI(H) + (1− p)(vI(`, 0)− µvAI (`, L)− (1− µ)vNI (`, L))
− 2p(vI(H)− vI(`, 0))] + (1− x∗I(µ))K ′′(x∗I(µ)).
Note that the Jacobian matrix J is the collection of second-order partial derivatives and
is negative definite assuming strict convexity of the cost function K(x). Hence the deter-
minant of the Jacobian matrix |J | is positive and the sign of the effect of acquisitions on
innovation probability is the same as the sign of weighted sum of I and E .
This sign is not clear ex-ante. If β = 0, so that vAE(L, `) = vNE (L, `), then the sign of
the effect on innovation probability is determined by
dPr(Innovation)
dµ




This effect is likely to be positive for large competition intensity in a duopoly, i.e. relatively
small π(L, `) = vNE (L, `) + κ.
If the entrant has all bargaining power, i.e. β = 1 and vAI (`, L) = vNI (`, L), we get a








If drastic innovation is not too profitable, i.e. vI(H) < 2vI(`, 0), a more lenient regime
towards acquisitions will increase innovation probability, irrespective of product market
competition intensity when both firms are active.
The above analysis shows that, in a model where firms cannot target their innovation
efforts towards specific R&D projects, the innovation effect of a more restrictive policy
towards acquisition of start-ups will in general be ambiguous.
B.3 Robustness Results
B.3.1 Innovation Uncertainty at the Time of Acquisition
The new timeline leads to the following result in the acquisition subgame:
Lemma B.1 (Acquisitions). Suppose at the time of the acquisition the technology level
of the innovation is uncertain. The incumbent acquires the entrant if and only if the
entrant holds a patent for the innovation. After the acquisition, the incumbent always
commercializes the H technology. She commercializes the L technology if and only if
π(L, 0)− π(`, 0) ≥ κ.
Proof. First, suppose that the entrant holds no patent. Then, since the entrant cannot
compete without an innovation, the incumbent’s profits are the same with or without the
acquisition. Thus, the incumbent has no reason to acquire the entrant.
Second, suppose the entrant holds a patent. Without an acquisition, the entrant com-
mercializes the technology irrespective of the realized technology level according to As-
sumption 2. He thus obtains the expected payoff p (π(H)− κ)+(1−p) (π(L, `)− κ) while
the incumbent obtains (1−p)π(`, L). With the acquisition, the incumbent commercializes
the H technology according to Assumption 2, but only commercializes the L technology
if π(L, 0) − κ ≥ π(`, 0). Thus, the incumbent’s expected payoff is p (π(H)− κ) + (1 −
p) (max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)}). The entrant obtains a payoff of zero. Consequently, the
expected acquisition surplus is
(1− p) [max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(L, `)− π(`, L) + κ]
The acquisition surplus is positive if and only if max{π(L, 0) − κ, π(`, 0)} > π(L, `) +
π(`, L)− κ, which holds by Assumption 1(iv).
Comparing Lemma B.1 to Lemma 1, we can see that acquisitions happen more fre-
quently. Not only does the incumbent acquire the entrant if his innovation turns out to be
non-drastic, but also if the entrant’s innovation turns out to be drastic. Thus, the entrant
will never enter the market, neither as competitor nor as new monopolist. However, he
will be compensated for the possibility that his innovation may turn out to be drastic.
Proposition B.2. With uncertainty at the time of acquisition, any investment equilibrium
under the alternative timeline with uncertainty is an investment equilibrium under the
original timeline without uncertainty and vice versa.
Proof. As in the main model, the equilibrium investment behavior will depend on the
critical projects, for which the respective firm E or I is just indifferent between investing
and not investing conditional on the behavior of the rival. Since, to be indifferent, payoffs
need to equal investment costs, we will first introduce the new values ṽi for each firm
i ∈ {I, E} at the beginning of the acquisition stage in the laissez-faire regime, depending
on whether the firm owns a patent, tinti ∈ {0, 1}:
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Lemma B.2 (Payoffs).
In the case with uncertainty at the time of acquisition, consider the laissez-faire policy.
(i) The entrant’s values after the realization of the innovation results are
ṽE(1, 0) = pπ(H) + (1−p)π(L, `)−κ+β(1−p)(max{π(L, 0)−κ, π(`, 0)}−π(L, `)−
π(`, L) + κ)
ṽE(0, t
int
I ) = 0 for tintI ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) The incumbent’s values after the realization of the innovation results are
ṽI(1, 0) = p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p) max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)}
ṽI(0, 1) = p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p) max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − ṽE(1, 0)
ṽI(0, 0) = π(`, 0).
We will refer to the critical thresholds under the alternative timeline, and thus new
values, as θ̃1i , θ̃2i , i ∈ {E, I}. It turns out that these critical projects are identical to their
counterparts in the original timeline without uncertainty:
C(θ̃1E) = ṽE(1, 0)
= pπ(H) + (1− p)π(L, `)− κ+
β(1− p)(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(L, `)− π(`, L) + κ)
= p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p)
(
π(L, `)− κ+
β(max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(L, `)− π(`, L) + κ)
)













C(θ̃1I ) = ṽI(1, 0)− ṽI(0, 0)
= p(π(H)− κ) + (1− p) max{π(L, 0)− κ, π(`, 0)} − π(`, 0)














(pπ(H) + (1− p)π(L, `)− κ+




(pvI(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)) = C(θ2I ).
Since projects costs are strictly increasing in θ, equality of costs establishes equality of the
values themselves, i.e. θ̃1i = θ1i and θ̃2i = θ2i for i ∈ {I, E}.
Again, under the no-acquisition policy, only two values change, vE(1, 0) = pπ(H) +
(1− p)π(L, `)−κ and vI(0, 1) = (1− p)π(`, L). Moreover, it is easy to see that the critical
values are identical irrespective of which timeline we assume. Recall that according to
Proposition A.1, the relative position of critical values is sufficient for the construction of
equilibrium research strategies.
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Proposition B.2 implies that equilibrium research strategies in the two policy regimes
do not depend on whether there is uncertainty at the time of acquisition. Moreover, we can
apply Propositions 3 to evaluate the effect of prohibiting acquisitions. Since the effect is
solely based on the research strategies, it is not affected by the amount of the uncertainty
at the time of acquisition.
B.3.2 Asymmetric Chances of Receiving Patents
We now prove the following result.
Proposition B.3. Consider the case with asymmetric patenting probabilities ρI ∈ (0, 1)
and ρE = 1− ρI .
(a) In any equilibrium (rNI , rNE ) under the no-acquisition policy, (i) the variety of research
projects is weakly smaller than in any equilibrium (rAI , rAE) under the laissez-faire
policy; and (ii) the probability of an innovation is weakly smaller than in any simple
equilibrium (rAI , rAE) under the laissez-faire policy.
(b) The policy effect ∆V = VA − VN is independent of ρI ∈ (0, 1).
The subgames after the end of the investment stage are the same as in the main
model, so that the continuation values under the laissez-faire policy are given by Lemma
2, and under the no-acquisition policy they are the same as in Lemma 2 except that
vNI (`, L) = π(`, L) and vNE (L, `) = π(L, `) − κ (as in the main model). In addition, the
critical projects θ1I and θ1E do not depend on ρ; so that their definition in Section 3 still
applies. However, ρI affects the critical projects θ2I and θ2E and thus the equilibrium
investments ri. Denote the critical project θ2I under the policy A for the given ρI as
θ2E(A, ρI), and similarly for the other critical projects. Under laissez-faire,
C(θ2E(A, ρI)) = (1− ρI) (pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `))
C(θ2I (A, ρI)) = pρIvI(H) + (1− p) (ρIvI(L, 0) + (1− ρI)vI(`, L))− (1− p)vI(`, L).
First, note that θ1E(A) > θ2E(A, ρI) for all ρI ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, since θ1E(A) and θ1I (A)
do not depend on ρI , the following result follows directly (by arguments which are standard
by now).
Lemma B.3. Fix any ρI ∈ (0, 1). Under the laissez-faire policy, in any equilibrium,
VA = max{θ1E(A), θ1I (A)}.
The critical projects under the no-acquisition policy, θ1I (N) and θ1E(N), are given as in
Section 3 and thus are independent of ρI . θ2I (N, ρI) and θ2E(N, ρI) are defined implicitly
as follows:
C(θ2E(N, ρI)) = (1− ρI)
(
pvE(H) + (1− p)vNE (L, `)
)
C(θ2I (N, ρI)) = pρIvI(H) + (1− p)
(
ρIvI(L, 0) + (1− ρI)vNI (`, L)
)
− (1− p)vNI (`, L).
Again, note that θ1E(N) > θ2E(N, ρI) for all ρI ∈ (0, 1) and thus, since θ1E(N) and θ1I (N)
do not depend on ρI , it follows directly that:
Lemma B.4. Fix any ρI ∈ (0, 1). Under the laissez-faire policy, in any equilibrium,
VN = max{θ1E(N), θ1I (N)}.
Therefore, neither VA nor VN depend on ρI , proving Proposition B.3.
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B.3.3 Heterogeneous Commercialization Costs
We now prove the following result.
Proposition B.4. Suppose κI < κE ≤ π(L, `) and π(L, 0)−π(`, 0) < κI ≤ π(H)−π(`, 0).
In any equilibrium (rNI , rNE ) under the no-acquisition policy,
(i) the variety of research projects is strictly smaller than in any equilibrium (rAI , rAE) under
the laissez-faire policy;
(ii) the probability of an innovation is strictly smaller than in any simple equilibrium
(rAI , r
A
E) under the laissez-faire policy.
Solving the game backwards, we first characterize the behavior of the firms in the
commercialization and acquisition subgames.
Lemma B.5. In the model with heterogeneous commercialization costs, the incumbent
acquires the entrant whenever the entrant holds a patent for any technology. The incumbent
commercializes only the technology H. The entrant commercializes both technologies.
Proof. Since by assumption π(L, 0) − π(`, 0) < κI ≤ π(H) − π(`, 0), the incumbent com-
mercializes only the H technology. Since π(H) > π(L, `) ≥ κE, the entrant commercializes
both technologies. In the acquisition stage, if the entrant does not hold a patent, there
is no reason for the acquisition. If the entrant holds a patent for the H technology, joint
profits strictly increase after the acquisition, since π(H) − κI > π(H) − κE. Hence, the
incumbent acquires the entrant. If the entrant holds a patent for the L technology, joint
profits strictly increase after the acquisition, since π(`, 0) > π(L, `)− κE + π(`, L), which
holds by Assumption 1. Hence, the incumbent acquires the entrant.
Under the laissez-faire policy, the continuation payoffs are given below.
(i) The entrant’s values after the realization of the innovation results are
vE(H) = π(H)− κE + β(κE − κI)
vE(L, `) = π(L, `)− κE + β(π(`, 0)− π(L, `)− π(`, L) + κE)
vE(0, tI) = 0 for tI ∈ {`, L,H}.
(ii) The incumbent’s values after the realization of the innovation results are
vI(H) = π(H)− κI
vI(L, 0) = vI(`, 0) = π(`, 0)
vI(`, L) = π(`, 0)− vE(L, `)
vI(`,H) = π(H)− κI − vE(H) = (1− β)(κE − κI).
Using these continuation values to calculate the critical values, we immediately obtain that
θ2E(A) < θ
1
E(A). Next, θ1I (A) < θ1E(A) if and only if
C(θ1I (A)) < C(θ
1
E(A))
pvI(H) + (1− p)vI(L, 0)− vI(`, 0) < pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)
p(π(H)− κI)− pπ(`, 0) < p (π(H)− κE + β(κE − κI)) + (1− p)vE(L, `)
p ((1− β)(κE − κI)− π(`, 0)) < (1− p)vE(L, `).
Since vE(L, `) > 0, for the above to hold it is sufficient that κE − κI ≤ π(`, 0). Since
π(L, `) ≥ κE and π(L, 0)−π(`, 0) < κI by assumption, then κE−κI < π(L, `)− (π(L, 0)−
π(`, 0)). Furthermore, π(L, `) ≤ π(L, 0) implies that π(L, `)− (π(L, 0)−π(`, 0)) ≤ π(`, 0),
so that κE − κI < π(`, 0) always holds. Therefore, θ1I (A) < θ1E(A) is always satisfied.
Together, this implies that θ1E(A) > max{θ2E(A), θ1I (A)}, which leads (by arguments
which are standard by now) to the following result.
44
Lemma B.6. Suppose that κI < κE ≤ π(L, `) and π(L, 0)−π(`, 0) < κI ≤ π(H)−π(`, 0).
Then, in any equilibrium under the laissez-faire policy, VA = θ1E(A).
Next, we analyze the no-acquisition policy. The continuation payoffs are given below.
(i) The entrant’s values after the realization of the innovation results are
vE(H) = π(H)− κE
vE(L, `) = π(L, `)− κE
vE(0, tI) = 0 for tI ∈ {`, L,H}.
(ii) The incumbent’s values after the realization of the innovation results are
vI(H) = π(H)− κI
vI(L, 0) = vI(`, 0) = π(`, 0)
vI(`, L) = π(`, L)
vI(`,H) = 0.
As before, it is immediate that θ2E(N) < θ1E(N). Next, θ1I (N) ≤ θ1E(N) if and only if
C(θ1I (N)) ≤ C(θ1E(N))
pvI(H) + (1− p)vI(L, 0)− vI(`, 0) ≤ pvE(H) + (1− p)vE(L, `)
p(π(H)− κI)− pπ(`, 0) ≤ p (π(H)− κE) + (1− p)(π(L, `)− κE)
−pκI − pπ(`, 0) ≤ (1− p)π(L, `)− κE.
For this inequality to hold, it is sufficient that
−p(π(L, 0)− π(`, 0))− pπ(`, 0) ≤ (1− p)π(L, `)− π(L, `)
−pπ(L, 0) ≤ −pπ(L, `)
π(L, 0) ≥ π(L, `)
which is satisfied by assumption. Therefore, θ1E(N) ≥ max{θ2E(N), θ1I (N)}, which leads
(by arguments which are standard by now) to the following result.
Lemma B.7. Suppose κI < κE ≤ π(L, `) and π(L, 0) − π(`, 0) < κI ≤ π(H) − π(`, 0).
Then, in any equilibrium under the no-acquisition policy, VN = θ1E(N).
Since θ1E(N) < θ1E(A), the two lemmas in this section prove Proposition B.4.
B.4 Consumer Surplus Effects in Figure 3
Product Market We consider a heterogenous Bertrand model with linear demand
(Shapley-Shubik). The utility of the representative consumer is given by:








where qi is the quantity consumed from firm i ∈ {I, E}, αi is a quality parameter and
γ governs substitutability. If γ = 0, both products are independent. As γ approaches
1, competition becomes more intense as the consumer prefers to consume more of only
one product, instead of balanced quantities of both products. Hence, when both firms are
active, the demand functions are:
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qi(pi, pj) =
αi − αjγ − pi + γpj
1− γ2
Define ti = ai − ci as the net surplus firm i can provide to the consumer. The incumbent
produces with technology tL ∈ R+, which is also the technology level of the entrant under a
non-drastic innovation, i.e. L = `. The minimum level of a drastic innovation is then given
by the condition that, even if the firm owning the drastic technology tH sets a monopoly
price, the rival firm cannot profitably compete in the market, which can be derived as
tH ≥ 2γ tL.
Assumptions 1(i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied by construction. For suitable parameter
spaces 1 (iv) and 2 are satisfied as well.
Innovation Effect We assume that C(θ) = sθ
1−θ (where s > 0) to calculate the equilib-
rium investments. Remember that for some critical value constellations, equilibria are not
unique. Therefore, we calculate bounds on the innovation and competition effects. Us-
ing Proposition 1, the upper and lower bound innovation probabilities in the laissez-faire
regime are
probA(H)/p = θ1E(A)




rE(A) + rI(A)− rE(A)rI(A)dθ, 0}
Using Proposition A.2, the upper and lower bound in the no-acquisition regime are:
probN(H)/p = θ1E(N)






rE(N) + rI(N)− rE(N)rI(N)dθ, 0}
probN(H)/p = θ1E(N)
−







rE(N) + rI(N)− rE(N)rI(N)dθ
∣∣∣∣∣
We obtain the upper bound on the effect on drastic innovation by selecting equilibria in the
two regimes, such that the policy has the least negative effect on the probability of drastic
innovation, which is probN(H) − probA(H). Similarly, the lower bound is probN(H) −
probA(H).
Competition Effect The competition effect is given by the reduction in the entry prob-
ability. Since there is no competition in the laissez-faire regime, we only need to consider
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the probability of an L innovation by the entrant in the no-acquisition regime. We again
calculate upper and lower bounds using Proposition A.2:




























Overall Consumer Surplus Effect Note that consumer surplus differences S(L,L)−
S(L) and S(H) − S(L) are calculated by the utility difference of the representative con-
sumer for the respective technological states of the firms. The upper bound on the con-
sumer surplus effect ∆S represents the effect of banning acquisitions when selecting equi-
libria which are most preferable to the policy change, thus considering the upper bound on
the competition and the innovation effect; vice versa for the lower bound on the consumer
surplus effect ∆S (see Proposition 5):
∆S = probN(L,L) [S(L,L)− S(L)] + (probN(H)− probA(H)) [S(H)− S(L)]
∆S = probN(L,L) [S(L,L)− S(L)] + (probN(H)− probA(H)) [S(H)− S(L)]
Parameter Values Figure 3 is then constructed considering product innovation with
identical costs c, and taking the following values for the quality parameters: aL = 1.85,
aH = 3.5. The scaling parameter in the investment cost function is taken to be 0.5 and the
commercialization costs are given by 0.01. Finally we consider an exogenous probability
of drastic innovation of 1.5%, which enables us to present unique consumer surplus effects,
that is effects where ∆S = ∆S. Making sure Assumption 1(iv) is satisfied in the model
requires γ ≥ 0.65, while Assumption 2 requires γ ≤ 0.95. Hence, Figure 3 is depicted in
the parameter space γ ∈ [0.65, 0.95] and β ∈ [0, 0.6].
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